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Cumberland Lodge Conference 2004 Report

The Commonwealth after Abuja

Cumberland Lodge, 14-15 January 2004

Session I: The Commonwealth and its Fundamental Principles: After Zimbabwe

Chair:
Derek Ingram
President Emeritus, Commonwealth Journalists' Association

Speakers:
Matthew Neuhaus
Director, Political Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat
Kayode Soyinka
Publisher, Africa Today

Respondent:
Kaye Whiteman
Former Editor, West Africa, and Former Director of Information, Commonwealth Secretariat

Derek Ingram began the session by confessing that he was something of a CHOGM groupie, having survived all eighteen Commonwealth summits since 1969. He remembered many dramatic ones: Singapore in 1971, when the Commonwealth first outlined its democratic principles, Lusaka in 1979, when a road-map to an independent Zimbabwe was drawn up, Vancouver in 1987, when Margaret Thatcher was isolated on South Africa, Harare in 1991, famous for its declaration of Commonwealth principles, Auckland in 1995, when Nigeria was suspended and CMAG was born, and now Abuja in 2003, when Zimbabwe left the Commonwealth. There was one common denominator: all had been dominated by issues principally affecting the Commonwealth countries in Africa, to the extent that member-states in other parts of the world sometimes felt pushed into second place. With the end of apartheid, many had thought that Africa would enter calmer waters, but this had not been the case. The Commonwealth, which included most of the countries of southern Africa, was unavoidably embroiled in the present crisis in Zimbabwe. The current crisis was particularly worrying since it threatened to undermine the Commonwealth ambition of racial harmony. Nevertheless he did not feel, as some apparently did, that the media was to blame for allowing Zimbabwe to dominate the recent CHOGM. The issues raised in Zimbabwe were central to the Commonwealth's future.

Kayode Soyinka agreed that it was a shame that an African problem once again dominated the CHOGM's agenda - though he and many others had predicted that this would be the case. President Obasanjo had been at pains to avoid such a situation, and there were many other pressing issues (such as HIV/AIDS) on which a summit of Commonwealth leaders could have made good progress. There had been many missed opportunities at Abuja.

President Obasanjo had been caught between a rock and a hard place: between the need to satisfy the long-term interests of the Commonwealth and pressure from some of his colleagues from southern Africa. His good relationship with President Mbeki of South Africa was clearly strained by the Zimbabwean issue, and he was embarrassed by the way the Zimbabwean issue had divided African countries, with the presidents of Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia all openly criticising the decision to continue Zimbabwe's suspension. Nevertheless he had survived the CHOGM with much credit, and with an enhanced stature.

Countries from other regions of Africa had supported the Commonwealth's continued suspension of Zimbabwe. Nevertheless this was not to say that African reactions to the crisis in Zimbabwe were not mixed. Many African leaders had supported the liberation struggle there, which had taken as its slogan 'freedom and the land'. In Africa, the right to a plot of land had symbolic and cultural as well as economic resonances. Yet in Zimbabwe, many years after majority rule, most of the population remained landless, and the size of many white-owned farms was beyond comprehension. African leaders therefore supported the principle of redistribution, while abhorring both the brutal methods which had been employed, and the fact that confiscated farms had been given to politicians, officials, judges or army officers rather than the landless agricultural workers. The waste of technical know-how in Zimbabwe was also alarming; even some of Mugabe's supporters, such as President Chissano of Mozambique and President Mwanawasa of Zambia, had offered land to displaced white farmers from Zimbabwe.

Mugabe's reaction to Zimbabwe's continued suspension showed that he was still in no mood to yield to pressure. What, therefore, was the future for Zimbabwe post-Abuja? Would Mugabe hang on to the bitter end? Or could he be persuaded to retire? And, if so, who would be his successor, and would his rule give way to a government of national unity, as the MDC demanded?

At the annual Zanu-PF conference, held in Masvingo on 4-6 December, an attempt to get the question of Mugabe's successor discussed was firmly rejected by the Vice-President, Joseph Msika, and Mugabe himself made clear that he had no intention of stepping down, claiming that he had 'a duty' and 'a mandate' to continue in office. Nevertheless there had been signs of movement in the Zanu-PF hierarchy, and it was clear that many of Mugabe's key lieutenants were beginning to look to a future post-Mugabe, even before the presidential elections due in 2008. One major factor in the search for a resolution of the crisis would be whether Mugabe and others from Zanu-PF could be offered immunity from prosecution for crimes such as those connected with the atrocities in Matabeleland, and whether they could remain safe in the possession of the wealth they had accumulated under Mugabe's rule. There had been much speculation over Mugabe's chosen successor. Two names frequently mentioned were Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former head of intelligence of ZANLA and of the Central Intelligence Organisation and current Speaker of Parliament, and Sydney Sekeramayi, the current Defence Minister and a member of Mugabe's Zezuru ethnic group.

Given Zimbabwe's increasingly desperate economic plight, it was likely that the country would implode before 2008. Inflation was running at an estimated 600%, unemployment was an estimated 70%, over two-thirds of the population faced food shortages, and the country suffered from one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS infection in the world. The IMF had begun the procedure of expelling Zimbabwe, as it had been in arrears since 2001 and now owed some $273 million. As Zimbabwe continued in economic free fall, Mugabe's position was becoming increasingly untenable, and the MDC was bound to gain in support, possibly intensifying the brutal police and army reaction. President Mbeki of South Africa held a crucial position, since South Africa was Zimbabwe's economic lifeline, and he needed to take steps to use that position to persuade Mugabe to retire. The Zimbabwean army also held a key to the situation. The military chiefs' support for Mugabe was now essential, but they were bound to act to prevent Zimbabwe sliding into chaos and civil war.

Matthew Neuhaus began by questioning the title of the session. To him, 'After Zimbabwe' seemed to imply that the Zimbabwean problem had now disappeared from the Commonwealth's agenda. In fact it remained central to Commonwealth activity, and the Commonwealth Secretariat already had a number of meetings planned in southern Africa which would have a direct bearing on the Zimbabwean problem.

The Commonwealth's fundamental principles had been re-affirmed at Abuja, which represented a very good outcome both for President Obasanjo and for the Secretary-General. In early 2003, when the Troika comprising the leaders of Australia, Nigeria and South Africa were divided over Zimbabwe, Don McKinnon had at the request of the three leaders consulted the Commonwealth leadership more broadly. He courageously took the responsibility for reflecting their broad view in the March 2003 Commonwealth Statement on Zimbabwe. In the light of lack of progress by Zimbabwe in response to its suspension, this extended the suspension until leaders could meet on the issue in Abuja in December. The Secretary-General's accurate reflection of the broad view had been vindicated by the Abuja CHOGM, despite the regrettable attacks on his own integrity and a challenge to his continuation in office he had to endure from those unhappy with the March decision.

The Abuja summit exploded the myth that the Commonwealth was divided on racial lines, and that it was just some relic of empire. Some of the strongest expressions of support for Zimbabwe's continued suspension in the light of continuing abuses of the Harare principles came from leaders from the Caribbean, the Pacific, and indeed Africa itself.

As conference secretary and secretary to the reference group of six leaders delegated to discuss the Zimbabwean issue, Matthew Neuhaus had been privileged to be present at most of the key meetings in Abuja. In his view, President Obasanjo had played a key role, and had confounded those who had underestimated him. It was at a series of meetings between Don McKinnon and President Obasanjo that the idea of a reference group emerged. In President Obasanjo's view, it was important that South Africa in particular should be fully involved in the discussions, and President Chissano of Mozambique (who was also Chairman of the Africa Union) was also brought in. There were two substantive meetings of the reference group, one before the retreat, and one on the 'free' morning on the Sunday. Throughout, and contrary to some reports, the discussion was extremely polite and sensible. Prime Minister P.J. Patterson of Jamaica was an outstanding chair.

At the first formal meeting of the reference group, there was some discussion of the idea that keeping Zimbabwe within the fold was more likely to make Mugabe amenable to change; but it was agreed that this could only be in a context in which Zimbabwe demonstrated its commitment to the Harare principles and responded to Commonwealth concerns. A first draft of a statement was taken to the retreat, where President Obasanjo made clear to the other leaders that he didn't want any discussion of Zimbabwe before the second meeting of the reference group. (The first day of the retreat was therefore given over as planned to discussion of democracy and development, with the result that, contrary to many reports, the CHOGM was not entirely overshadowed by the Zimbabwean problem.)

By the time of the second meeting of the reference group, it was widely anticipated that Zimbabwe would leave the Commonwealth if its suspension was continued, even though the statement was drafted with a focus on encouraging Zimbabwe to respond positively so that it could return to full Commonwealth membership. Nevertheless there was a clear consensus in the reference group that the Commonwealth should have concern for Zimbabwe and the Harare principles at its centre; and discussion also focused on the procedure and consultation of the group and the broader membership for the lifting of the suspension in the light of an eventual positive response by Zimbabwe.

Before the Sunday afternoon retreat session, President Obasanjo and Prime Minister Patterson spoke to President Mugabe, and were left under no illusions but that he would pull Zimbabwe out of the Commonwealth. At the Sunday afternoon session itself, there was a very thorough discussion of the issues, and despite some SADC countries' unease there was a clear consensus in favour of continued suspension. The Heads of Government then issued their statement on the Sunday evening. The main problem was the media reaction - particularly from the British press, with early reports on the BBC and in other media encouraged it appeared by some in Downing Street portraying the outcome of the CHOGM as a victory for Blair and a defeat for Mbeki. This flew in the face not only of President Obasanjo's appeal for the issue to be handled diplomatically but also of the facts themselves. Many African leaders were incensed at the British media coverage, and this helped to encourage a push by some SADC countries for a separate statement. President Obasanjo was forced to intervene to ensure that there would be no separate SADC statement until after the CHOGM concluded. Prime Minister Blair's statement to the House of Commons after the CHOGM made clear that the early British media reports were wrong, and that the outcome was largely an African- and Commonwealth-brokered one.

It was clear that President Obasanjo (as Chair of the Commonwealth), the Secretary-General and the Commonwealth Secretariat now had more to do in working through the issues with some SADC countries. There were many issues in southern Africa which they needed to spend time on, and it was therefore inevitably true that, to follow up Derek Ingram's point, Africa would continue to loom large on the Commonwealth's agenda in the immediate future.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth in general, and President Obasanjo and Don McKinnon in particular, had emerged well from the CHOGM. President Obasanjo was determined still to try to broker a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis, and the Commonwealth Secretariat was still closely engaged. As in the case of South Africa under apartheid, the Commonwealth's good offices role would be of continuing and indeed increased importance.

The Commonwealth had much else on its agenda after Abuja. In particular there was a need to build on and implement the Aso Rock Declaration on democracy and development; to broaden the engagement between the Commonwealth's 'official' institutions and civil society; to engage better with the media (getting the message across once for all that the Commonwealth was far more than a relic of empire, and was here to stay); and to build on multilateral partnerships and synergies with other international organisations, such as the UN, the EU, and La Francophonie. These were all areas which the Heads of Government had discussed and highlighted as priorities in their meetings in Abuja.

Kaye Whiteman said that it had been interesting to watch a CHOGM from the outside, having been on the other side of the fence at the Durban CHOGM in 1999 (admittedly one of the smoothest of CHOGMs, and in effect a celebration of the return of South Africa to the Commonwealth). In Abuja he had been struck by how isolated the media were from what was going on behind closed doors, and how the information received was second-hand, filtered, or spun. Other issues had been discussed, but it was inevitable that the Zimbabwean problem would dominate media coverage of the meeting. Here was a real political issue, which could not be avoided. Indeed, here was a piece of genuine political theatre. It was unavoidable that the media should have picked up on this as the real CHOGM story.

Given Zimbabwe's departure from the Commonwealth, some might question whether all the haggling over the Abuja declaration, and all the discussion that went into devising and fine-tuning a model for Zimbabwe's re-admission, was worth it. Much now seemed of merely academic interest. Nevertheless the Commonwealth was right to treat the issue seriously, and Matthew Neuhaus was right to emphasise that in the process the Commonwealth had emphatically not been divided along racial lines, and that the Commonwealth's stance at Abuja had been largely African-brokered.

It was clear that President Obasanjo had emerged from the CHOGM enhanced in stature. In the immediate future, the role of Chair of the Commonwealth might become a more significant one. There was still room for constructive pressure, and for a Commonwealth good offices role. The suggestion of possible friction between Nigeria and South Africa had, he thought, been distinctly overplayed; common interests and both traditional and personal close relations would undoubtedly ensure that President Obasanjo would continue to work constructively with President Mbeki, and with other Commonwealth leaders from southern Africa.

Kaye Whiteman agreed that the Commonwealth had always had some problems both with its media image and with the way its official institutions related to the media and made information available to them. It was also easy to blame the media for many of the Commonwealth's difficulties. Some sections of the media undoubtedly did have dubious motives. Nevertheless it was wrong to lump all the media together as objects of distrust. He had gone through all the press clippings about the CHOGM at Marlborough House, and this had been an illuminating process. Even the British press had on the whole been surprisingly positive. Coverage in the Nigerian press had been extensive and included much serious discussion of important issues - such as whether there was a case for giving the Commonwealth more structure, including a clearer procedure for electing the Secretary-General.

• It was suggested that while the Abuja CHOGM had seen a vindication of the Commonwealth's fundamental principles, looking to the future there was less certainty about the Commonwealth's willingness to promote them. There were three institutions responsible for safeguarding the Commonwealth's principles between CHOGMs: the Chair, the Secretary-General, and CMAG. While, as individuals, President Obasanjo and Don McKinnon had undoubtedly emerged triumphant, there was a case for arguing that in the longer term all three institutions had been weakened by the CHOGM. President Obasanjo clearly had bridges to mend, and was perhaps unlikely to be particularly proactive in future. The same was true of the Secretary-General, who, in taking a courageous line, had found himself and his own position under attack. In both cases, it was reasonable to question whether, as institutions, the Chair and the Secretary-General would in future be willing to risk such difficulties. As for the third institution, CMAG, this had clearly been sidelined by the committee of six, and in the long term its position looked likely to be much weaker.
• Matthew Neuhaus responded by agreeing that CMAG may have been weakened by the CHOGM: the feeling had clearly emerged that on an issue as complex as Zimbabwe a group of foreign ministers would not carry enough weight. Nevertheless the future of CMAG would undoubtedly be revisited. He strongly disagreed concerning both the Secretary-General and the Chair. He felt in particular that President Obasanjo was likely to be a notably proactive Chair.
• One of the journalists who attended CHOGM said that he had found the CHOGM very difficult, and one of the worst ever when it came to finding out what was going on. At times there appeared to be no channels of communication. This led to a deep sense of frustration amongst journalists, and a tendency to seize on whatever snippets of information were available - especially given that many of the journalists present were not international relations specialists (and that many of the British lobby journalists, for instance, were used to seeing things in terms of victories or defeats). There were always going to be difficult meetings and outcomes from them. The Commonwealth needed to explain and take advantage of these situations, rather than bringing down barriers to the release of information. In the richer countries of the Commonwealth in particular, the idea of the Commonwealth had a very fragile grip on public opinion, and the Commonwealth needed all the publicity it could get. At Abuja the Commonwealth clearly did not go about handling its opportunities the right way. Journalists were left with so little to go on that it was inevitable that false impressions would emerge. There was an enormous need for more openness; otherwise the Commonwealth's ideal of consensus could rapidly fall apart.
• Another participant reinforced these points. Though he had not been to as many CHOGMs as Derek Ingram, he too could describe himself as a CHOGM groupie, and the Abuja CHOGM was undoubtedly the most frustrating one he had been to, in terms of the provision of information. This was true of the Zimbabwe issue itself, and matters were made no better by the way news of the challenge to the Secretary-General emerged. This perhaps increased the need for the Secretary-General to be appointed in future by much more transparent means. Don McKinnon had been supported by a very respectable majority, but the way news filtered out about the challenge to his position served only to heighten the speculation about splits within the Commonwealth.
• Matthew Neuhaus was willing to concede that the Commonwealth's relationship with the media had not been handled perfectly at Abuja, and also that there was a need for a better dialogue in future. Nevertheless he was glad that the barrier had come down on information about the discussion of Zimbabwe: it would have been impossible to conduct such a reasonable discussion in the full glare of media coverage, and reasonableness was made much more difficult once leaders began breaking ranks. He thought it unlikely that the Commonwealth would have secured as much consensus as it did had leaders been talking to the media throughout.
• Another participant from the Commonwealth Secretariat agreed that in the case of Zimbabwe it had proven helpful that discussions at the CHOGM had taken place behind closed doors. What hadn't been bargained for was the fact that so many journalists attending had little international experience, and would be taking things out of context. It also hadn't helped that the press offices of some heads of government had broken ranks, and had attempted to spin events in their own way.
• Asked about Uganda's disappointment at the decision to hold the next CHOGM in Malta, Matthew Neuhaus said that much of the disappointment stemmed from a belief that Uganda had stood aside for Nigeria when the 2003 CHOGM venue was being decided. It was also felt that it was east Africa's turn to hold a CHOGM, southern and west Africa having had their turns.

Session II: The Millennium Development Goals, the WTO and Economic Renaissance: Can the Commonwealth Make a Difference?

Chair:
Sir Humphrey Maud
Former Deputy Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat

Speakers:
Indrajit Coomaraswamy
Director, Economic Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat
Steve Godfrey
Director, Commonwealth Business Council

Respondent:
Sir Michael McWilliam
Chairman, Royal African Society

Indrajit Coomaraswamy said that from afar it must have been easy to conclude that the Abuja CHOGM had been entirely dominated by the Zimbabwean problem. The issues raised by the question of Zimbabwe's suspension had been very important and difficult, and it was right both that they should have been confronted and that they should have been widely reported. Nevertheless there had been substantive discussion of a number of other topics, including in particular economic and social issues. President Obasanjo had been anxious to place a high premium on these, and there had been important progress made at the small states' meetings, in the executive sessions, and in the discussion of the expert group's report on democracy and development at the retreat. As a result, the Aso Rock Declaration contained some very robust statements on a number of development issues, especially trade.

Progress towards the millennium development goals had so far been very mixed. It looked possible that the overall targets might be met through the strong performance of China and India. Elsewhere the picture was less positive, and a number of Commonwealth countries were amongst those clearly not on target. This reflected the uneven development associated with globalisation. Work carried out by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the International Labour Organisation highlighted vividly the process whereby two key constituencies - small economies, and most of Africa - were being marginalised by globalisation. The problem was in part a political one, in that much of the appetite for the efforts needed had dissipated. Much thought was given at Abuja to this problem, and to identifying ways in which the Commonwealth could make a difference. The Aso Rock Declaration included a passage inserted by the Heads themselves, declaring that it was 'the strategic goal of the Commonwealth to help their pre-industrial members to transition into skilled ... societies, recognising that their domestic policies must be conducive to such transitions'.

The Heads of Government also addressed the need to stimulate private investment in developing countries. It was not possible for countries to benefit from globalisation without developing the capacity to produce goods which were tradeable in the international market. Many countries had implemented all the important pre-requisites for attracting foreign investment, yet had still failed to attract it. Invariably the reason was that these countries suffered from handicaps of size or vulnerability which attached a risk premium to their economies. In the past, these handicaps had been compensated for by trade preferences, but as these were eroded by changes in the multilateral trade framework, the economies of many small or vulnerable countries were struggling to produce goods and services for their own markets, let alone for export. There was a need to develop new ways to address the incremental risk premium which was a result of these endowed handicaps. The Commonwealth Secretariat was already working with other multilateral organisations and with financial institutions on schemes to benefit to the Pacific, and the Aso Rock Declaration gave impetus to the effort to replicate these schemes for the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa.

The Heads of Government identified the improvement of trade opportunities as the most potent means of reducing poverty in developing countries. They collectively regretted the breakdown of the WTO talks at Cancun, and urged a renewed commitment to the resumption of negotiations. Conventional wisdom had it that not a great deal was likely to be achieved in 2004, given the need for a period of reflection post-Cancun, that the US and Canada faced elections, and that the EU would be in the hands of a new set of Commissioners. Many people believed that the real deadline was mid-2006, which would see the end of the fast-track negotiating authority in the US. The Commonwealth position was that the world could not afford to waste a whole year or more, and that it was important that the major players (including the US and the EU) should remain committed to the principle of multilateral rather than bilateral agreements. Hence the Commonwealth's Aso Rock statement on multilateral trade, and hence - following the precedent of the Cyprus CHOGM, when the Uruguay Round had stalled - the mandating of the Secretary-General to mount a high-level trade mission to urge re-engagement in the Doha Round. The Commonwealth Secretariat was working on the details of such a mission, which would aim to visit Geneva, Brussels, London, Washington, Tokyo, and possibly other cities.

The particular problems of small states in confronting globalisation again received attention from the Heads of Government, who renewed the Commonwealth's commitment to assisting them through technical capacity-building programmes to negotiate agreements relevant to small economies. The Commonwealth Secretariat's role in providing expert advice to ACP countries in their negotiations with the EU on Economic Partnership Agreements was also re-affirmed. In an exciting development, the leading American economist Joseph Stiglitz had agreed to work with the Commonwealth Secretariat in addressing a framework for a successful delivery of the Doha development agenda, in particular identifying ways in which the international institutions could help small economies to cope with changes in the trade environment, particularly the loss of preferences.

The Heads of Government also addressed a number of other key development issues at Abuja. On debt, they called on the international institutions to adopt a more flexible approach, in order to release resources for health and education. The HIPC initiative had provided significant relief, but it was clear that a broader and deeper approach was needed. The Heads of Government accordingly endorsed the work of the Commonwealth Ministerial Forum of ten highly-indebted and four donor countries, to perform an advocacy role on debt issues. On aid, the Aso Rock Declaration called both for an increase in its quantity and an improvement in its effectiveness, including reductions in tied aid, an increase in direct budgetary support aid, and implementation of the Rome Declaration on harmonisation. On HIV/AIDS, the Heads called for strong political leadership to ensure effective health and education systems, adequate external support to achieve this, and immediate and effective implementation of the WTO agreement on affordable drugs.

The Heads of Government emphasised in their Aso Rock Declaration the importance of building partnerships with business and civil society organisations. They also recognised that democracy and development were interrelated, declaring themselves 'convinced that broad-based prosperity creates the stability conducive to the promotion of democracy; and that strong democratic institutions better promote development'. There had of course been much academic debate over the precise interrelationship between democracy and development, which suggested that the connection was not entirely straightforward; authoritarian regimes had tended to be either notably high-performing or notably low-performing, with democracies occupying the middle range. Nevertheless much of the evidence referred to the framework of the Cold War period, when normal patterns were distorted. In any case, it was certainly true, as the Heads had declared, that 'development and democracy are goals each in its own right'.

All in all, the Abuja CHOGM had produced substantial discussion and important statements on economic and social issues, and had set the Commonwealth a challenging agenda for the years ahead.

Steve Godfrey said that while the Commonwealth had long been engaged in social and economic issues, the salience which they now had was relatively recent. In the 1980s and early 1990s it was primarily known for its engagement with political issues, such as the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and the promotion of democracy and good governance more generally. Its engagement with social and economic issues had been given particular impetus by the Edinburgh CHOGM in 1997. The Commonwealth had subsequently done a lot of work around HIPC, and had engaged with the private sector through the Private Investment Initiative and the Commonwealth Business Council, itself a product of the Edinburgh CHOGM. The Commonwealth had also made significant interventions in the Seattle and Doha rounds of the WTO negotiations, and had contributed in an important way to emerging alliances amongst developing countries. As a genuinely global and diverse association, the Commonwealth was perhaps uniquely placed to contribute positively to the effective management of the effects of globalisation.

It was now becoming clear that the problems faced by developing countries were not just ones of access to markets, but hidden subsidies and trade barriers. Equity issues were coming to the fore, and the Commonwealth needed to work with its member states to address these. At the recent CBC meeting in Abuja, Steve Godfrey had been struck by the strength of feeling on these issues, with many participants emphasising that the developed world's agricultural subsidies were what needed to be addressed first in any new trade negotiations.

As Indrajit Coomaraswamy had emphasised, a number of developing countries, especially from the ACP, had done fantastically well in implementing adjustment programmes and the principles of multilateral agreements, but what little investment had resulted was virtually confined to extractive industries and parastatals such as telecommunications. Ways had to be found to help these countries attract much-needed investment, and to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by globalisation.

The Commonwealth was perhaps in a unique position to help developing countries address the obstacles to their development, since unlike other international organisations it was widely seen as non-threatening and as working in the best interests of these countries. Though it could not help to any great extent through the direct provision of aid, it could help very substantially in developing initiatives and strategies for dealing with the underlying problems, and in performing a networking and advocacy role for the interests of marginalised developing countries.

It was clear that the Commonwealth already was doing much that was useful in connection with the Millennium Development Goals, the WTO negotiations, and economic renaissance. Nevertheless, it was also clear that the Commonwealth could be doing a lot more. Though it had begun to find an important role in connection with social and economic issues, its potential was as yet largely unfulfilled.

• One participant suggested that with Malta and Cyprus set to join the EU, there was the interesting and hopeful possibility of the emergence of a Commonwealth group within the EU and vice versa. Another thought that the UK's presidency of the EU and chairmanship of the G8 in 2005 represented an opportunity for Commonwealth influence. Nevertheless other participants expressed scepticism about the extent to which the UK or indeed other countries were likely to emphasise their Commonwealth credentials in other international contexts. There was a tendency for governments to compartmentalise their different commitments, and hence to be under-ambitious in terms of promoting an agenda across different international fora.
• One participant argued that international trade negotiations were in effect a zero-sum game: what was good for one country would be bad for other countries. The major players such as the US and the EU had to represent the interests of their own people just as the governments of developing countries sought to represent the interests of theirs. There was a need to face up to this reality by seeking to find commanilities between the interests of differing alliances of countries, rather than aiming for ideal solutions. Other participants argued that multilateral trade negotiations were not zero-sum, but positive-sum. When trade talks were stalled between the US and the EU in the early 1990s, it was the developing countries who lost out most. There would be benefits to all from a more open trade environment.
• Asked whether the help given by the Commonwealth Secretariat to ACP countries in their negotiations with the EU was paralleled by any comparable assistance in their negotiations with NAFTA, Indrajit Coomaraswamy said that the trade policy advisers attached to Caricom and in other ways assisting ACP countries were providing an infrastructure of expertise across negotiations, whether with the WTO, the EU or NAFTA.
• Given both speakers' emphasis on the possible role for the Commonwealth in helping to provide the right conditions for developing countries to benefit from globalisation, it was suggested that the Commonwealth Development Corporation (which had been through many changes since its inception) might be put to work in better ways.
• Questioned about the status of the report on democracy and development from the expert group led by Manmohan Singh, Indrajit Coomaraswamy said that the report had been well-received by the Heads of Government, and the Aso Rock Declaration had picked up on a number of its key themes, with a requirement to report back to subsequent CHOGMs. Many of the report's recommendations were addressed to national governments and other international institutions, rather than to the Secretariat itself, and the report deserved a wider airing.

Sir Michael McWilliam said that it was emphatically not his view that the trade liberalisation process was a zero-sum game It sometimes seemed that way because of the negative consequences frequently experienced during the transitional stages. In situations where there was over-supply, the only long-term solution was for the weaker producers to go out of production. Nevertheless all the evidence as well as the intellectual arguments pointed to the conclusion that trade liberalisation was in the long run good for all.

Sir Michael McWilliam agreed with Indrajit Coomaraswamy that there was a real need for the Commonwealth to help by addressing the problem of risk premiums through endowed handicaps. This was exactly what the Commonwealth Development Corporation was originally set up to do, but was now not allowed to do, since its re-organisation into what was in effect a private equity fund for developing countries. It was a pity that the UK government hadn't used the CDC more actively, so that private equity investors didn't have to face the additional hurdle of overcoming endowed handicaps.

It was clear that the Commonwealth had never been, and was not likely to be, a significant conduit for resources. What it was far more effective at doing was acting as a sort of think tank, changing the climate of opinion, creating the right policy environments, and substituting appropriate for inappropriate development thinking. The Commonwealth Secretariat acted most helpfully as a source of sound opinion and advice, assisting its member states to formulate strong but realistic negotiating positions. It could also help to raise the profile of issues affecting developing countries within the developed world. While it was necessary to recognise the limits to the Commonwealth's effectiveness, there were many areas in which its activities could be developed, to the benefit of all its member states.

Indrajit Coomaraswamy also thought that trade liberalisation was positive-sum. The problem in the short term was how to manage the transitional adjustments that were necessary. The solution currently proferred - that countries should simply tighten their belts - often led to a spiral downwards. The Commonwealth should be able to help address this problem, as also the supply bottlenecks which hindered developing countries' progress, and the tariff escalation that prevented them getting appropriate value for their commodities. There was a need to make the Commonwealth's interventions as effective as possible, which meant working in partnership with business, civil society and other international organisations, and concentrating resources on those niche areas where the Commonwealth could add value. A good example was the Secretariat's work with regional organisations preparing for the second phase of post-Cotonou EU-ACP negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements; another was the work of the small states' expert group, which was working with member countries to identify priorities for small states in WTO negotiations. Indrajit Coomaraswamy agreed with Steve Godfrey that the Commonwealth was well placed to help in such areas, being both a friendly and respected voice and flexible enough to provide customised and appropriate assistance.

Steve Godfrey said that the Commonwealth had suffered persistent crises of identity and purpose, which in part reflected the way it worked, largely in the background and facilitating rather than directly managing. Nevertheless it had an ability to identify the real issues, and to utilise its strengths of flexibility and diversity to address them. There was perhaps a need for the Commonwealth to develop more of a 'big issue' image, around security, globalisation and poverty, which were the burning issues of the early twenty-first century. The Commonwealth could afford to be, and perhaps needed to be, more ambitious.

Session III: The Commonwealth Now: A Post-Abuja Health-Check

Chair:
Stephen Cox
Chairman, The Round Table

Speakers:
Stephen Chan
Dean, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, SOAS

Stephen Chan began by saying that the Abuja CHOGM had been a very interesting, and in some respects a landmark meeting, and had touched on a range of political and economic issues. Nevertheless he invited his audience to take a step back, and assess the reality against the potential. Regular meetings of Heads of Government were a distinctive feature of the Commonwealth, and one of its greatest strengths. Every two years some fifty Heads gathered together, with the scope for in-depth discussion of the burning issues of the day. Yet at Abuja the key questions in contemporary international politics - by what rights do some people wage terror on others, and by what rights do some states launch war on others? - were apparently not even discussed. Instead, most of the discussions revolved around the question of the continued suspension of one rogue state with no great external repercussions. Moreover, the summit was notable for the challenge to the Secretary-General, a breach of precedent by a scratch candidate with reportedly significant backing. Meanwhile interest in the Commonwealth within member countries was rapidly failing, and meetings about the Commonwealth seemed to attract the same old hands. Crucially, the Commonwealth was failing to attract the interest of younger people. A new generation had not arisen to carry the torch. What else hadn't arisen? What was going on with the Commonwealth? What could it be? And what did people wish it to be?

Every time someone asked the questions, 'What does the Commonwealth stand for?', 'What contribution does the Commonwealth make?', the informed answer would come back that the Commonwealth did a lot of good work in all sorts of niche areas, such as election monitoring and technical co-operation. The big questions were answered by small aggregates. This mindset had to a certain extent been forced on the Commonwealth, especially the Commonwealth Secretariat. Every fifteen years or so the Secretariat was audited scrupulously for value for money. The Secretariat would convince its inquisitors that it had fulfilled this or that objective, and the Commonwealth as an official organisation would lurch on. Then the Secretariat would be tasked with x or y further objectives, without any corresponding increase of resources. And so on. But did the Commonwealth meet any major international needs, or address the major international questions?

Outside the small circles of those interested in the Commonwealth, mention of it frequently elicited the reaction, 'I thought it had died a long time ago'. Within international relations as an academic discipline, just as in the actual conduct of diplomacy between nations, the Commonwealth was at best a peripheral player. In countries outside the Commonwealth, asked about the future of the world, people would mention the Commonwealth not at all. In its developed countries, and even in countries which had benefited from Commonwealth assistance programmes, it featured only third or fourth on the list of priorities in international relations. Clearly the Commonwealth was in danger of dying of neglect.

Most people's view of the Abuja summit would have been that it was a disaster. Even those with a real interest in the Commonwealth would agree that it was a PR disaster. The issues that dominated the meeting could easily have been discussed and agreed beforehand (Stephen Chan's own readings of the press from southern Africa around the time of the CHOGM reinforced him in this view), leaving the Heads free to make a real contribution on an important issue. Instead, the meeting was at best a sideshow, and more realistically a wasted opportunity.

It was interesting to compare the Abuja summit with what happened in Lusaka in 1979, which drew up what would later be called a road-map for Zimbabwe. Then, there had been a great deal of diplomatic traffic beforehand; there had been a will to work together; and the Heads of Government were made to work together by a strong and charismatic chairman, Kenneth Kaunda. President Obasanjo was in many ways a more accomplished chairman than Kaunda, but 2003 was very different to 1979. In 2003 it seemed that all the diplomatic traffic had primarily been to get the Commonwealth out of a difficulty rather than to explore a creative pan-Commonwealth view of how to go forward. There had been little sign of any real will to work together. Indeed, the fissures were likely to be more pronounced after Abuja.

Part of the problem was, surely, that it was not clear whether the Commonwealth was not sure whether it was an international organisation, or an intergovernmental one. The Secretariat appeared to be trying to have portfolios for all sorts of areas, to mirror the UN and other international organisations, to be all things to all people. The inevitable result was that at best it could accomplish small tasks, but failed on the big issues. An organisation the size of the Secretariat could only do so much. Indeed, if it wished to be successful in all its current areas of work it needed much more money. The only realistic way to become more effective was to scale down in order to concentrate on real strengths. The Commonwealth needed to do a few things really well rather than many things moderately well.

The Commonwealth's difficulties over Zimbabwe illustrated the need to improve its diplomatic machinery. One model might be the UN, where the Secretary-General had at his disposal some extraordinarily high-calibre, experienced political and economic experts as Assistant Secretaries-General and Special Representatives, who were adroit at high-level political diplomacy and brokerage, mobile, and empowered to intervene flexibly on behalf of the Secretary-General. Another might be the Commonwealth's own Eminent Persons' Group, which had intervened very successfully in South Africa. At present the Commonwealth Secretary-General had very limited diplomatic resources at his disposal. Yet the expectations of him appeared to be moving him in the direction of a more personal and sensitive diplomatic role than had hitherto been the case.

The time would be arriving soon when the Commonwealth Secretariat and the members states of the Commonwealth would need to make some hard decisions. There had been many points at which the Commonwealth had found a key role for itself - over the New International Economic Order, or South Africa, or in the economic and political debates of the early 1990s. The Commonwealth needed a new paradigm, and a new role, for the 2000s. In finding one it needed to be realistic about where it stood, and about how it could capitalise on its strengths. Otherwise it risked becoming a fossil.

• In agreeing with Stephen Chan, one participant suggested that if no convincing answer could be found to the question, 'What is the Commonwealth for?', then the Commonwealth would continue to fade into irrelevance.
• One participant agreed that the Commonwealth was not likely to be placed more than third or fourth in a country's priorities, but suggested that the real problem was to make sure that the attention given the Commonwealth by its member countries was as high in quality as the attention given to other international organisations. If the Commonwealth received only 20% of a government's attention, that would be bearable so long as that 20% was of the same quality as the other 80%. In response, Stephen Chan re-phrased his question: how could the Commonwealth become top of the also-rans? It could only do so for quality reasons, which in his view meant doing fewer, but more identifiable things.
• Stephen Chan was challenged on his view of the Abuja CHOGM as a disaster. The Commonwealth made a stand on principle, and the Secretary-General in particular had emerged with much credit. Indeed, the Commonwealth was the only international organisation to have given real heart to those struggling for human rights in Zimbabwe, and at Abuja - with African leadership and strong African endorsement - had reaffirmed its commitment to democratic values. Its record compared very favourably to that of the UN or the EU. Stephen Chan responded by saying that the agreement reached on Zimbabwe was an achievement. The Secretary-General had shown great courage in bringing this about. Nevertheless, the agreement on Zimbabwe was widely seen as the CHOGM's only achievement - which, for a meeting of some fifty Heads of Government, with so much potential, was not a great deal. The Commonwealth needed to make an impact on the major players, not just on its own members, and it also needed to make an impact on issues which were of global importance, not just internal matters.
• It was pointed out that international organisations had a tendency to go up and down in the priorities of particular governments and regions. Not that long ago GATT - the forerunner of the WTO - existed largely in the shadow of UNCTAD. One of the questions that people interested in the Commonwealth should be asking was, why did such rises and falls happen? Perhaps the answer lay, as Stephen Chan suggested, in the extent to which international organisations were able to be keyed into the major debates which existed. The Commonwealth had a number of strengths in attempting to be top of the also-rans - particularly its diversity, and its role as a bridge-builder between countries of different cultures, levels of development, etc.
• Pressed on his distinction between the Commonwealth's international and intergovernmental roles, Stephen Chan observed that the Commonwealth had, from the time of Sonny Ramphal onwards, moved beyond the intergovernmental. With regard to Zimbabwe, for instance, the Commonwealth had behaved as if it were an international organisation. It needed to build around its international role. This of course meant that the Secretary-General needed to be supported by appropriate resources.
• A number of participants took issue with Stephen Chan's suggestion of special representatives of the Secretary-General, along the lines of the UN. The model had had mixed results for the UN, particularly when static and mobile responsibilities were combined. Moreover this would mean a complete overhaul of the Secretariat's existing machinery. Stephen Chan agreed that there were problems with the UN model; nevertheless he thought that there were also many positive aspects. He also agreed that the existing structure of the Commonwealth Secretariat, which reflected its intergovernmental mission, would have to change; he thought this was necessary to ensure that the Commonwealth could become a dynamic international organisation.
• Several participants disagreed with Stephen Chan's premise, that the real burning issues in international relations related to terrorism and the right to wage war. The biggest issues confronting humanity were exactly those addressed by the Abuja theme of democracy and development. Some 3,000 people died in the terrible events of 11 September 2001, but every day three times that number died prematurely in Africa from poverty or HIV/AIDS. Stephen Chan responded by saying that it was the enormity of these problems that made it so difficult for the Commonwealth to make a real impact. Fine words in declarations were all very well, but they made little difference to people's lives. The Commonwealth could not be the UNDP or Oxfam, and was not equipped to try. It was therefore necessary for the Commonwealth to concentrate on what it could do well.
• A number of participants thought that fine words in declarations did in fact have real resonances and consequences. Most obviously this was the case with the Harare Declaration, which had helped a number of states to move from one-party states to multi-party systems, but it was true in other areas as well. For instance, in the fight against poverty the Commonwealth's declarations had translated into a number of effective programmes.
• There was much support for Stephen Chan's point that the Commonwealth Secretariat was to a large extent a victim of circumstances, in having ended up with so many roles. It had since its inception been a demand-led organisation. At each ministerial or Heads of Government meeting it was given new mandates, though seldom with the resources needed to fulfil them. In the past the Secretariat had gone along with this, but it was now clear that several programmes were wearing thin, and that the arguments for them were disappearing. Better means perhaps needed to be found for terminating as well as initiating activities and programmes, and for prioritising between them.
• Stephen Chan said that he was mindful of the solid, pragmatic work that the Commonwealth did, which was of direct benefit to Commonwealth citizens. Nevertheless, he thought that the Commonwealth had reached the point where it needed to take some hard decisions. Every organisation had to face the choice between reform and demise, and the Commonwealth was no exception. The way the Commonwealth had been founded in 1965, and the way it had continued since then, would not be sufficient to carry it forward into the future, and to capture the commitment and imagination of its governments and citizens, particularly the young. The Commonwealth needed to focus its efforts much more clearly, and in areas which responded much more directly to the needs of the day.

Session IV: Engaging Civil Society: Future Partnerships or Misplaced Tokenism?

Chair:
Tim Slack
Former Chairman, The Round Table

Speakers:
Colin Ball
Director, Commonwealth Foundation
Jagadananda
Member-Secretary, Centre for Youth and Social Development, Orissa

Respondent:
Richard Bourne
Head, Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit

Colin Ball said that the history of civil society's engagement with the official Commonwealth institutions began with the creation of the Commonwealth Foundation in 1966; nevertheless civil society's engagement with CHOGMs was more recent, and still developing. The first Commonwealth NGO Forum was held in Zimbabwe in 1991, some six months before the Harare CHOGM. The Nicosia CHOGM in 1993 saw the beginnings of NGO accreditation, and that wonderful invention, the NGO 'lounge'. The second Commonwealth NGO Forum was held in Wellington in 1995, again some time before the CHOGM held in Auckland. The Wellington forum resulted in the endorsement of the Commonwealth Foundation's landmark guidelines for good practice. It was in Edinburgh in 1997 that civil society organisations first met at the same time as the CHOGM; important innovations included the Commonwealth People's Centre, which enabled civil society organisations to celebrate their achievements and display their wares, and the Commonwealth Business Forum and the Commonwealth Youth Forum. The third Commonwealth NGO Forum was held in Durban in 1999, now close in time and space to the CHOGM, and there was also a second Commonwealth People's Centre. The Commonwealth NGO Forum that year endorsed the Commonwealth Foundation report, 'Civil Society in the New Millennium', which drew on the views and perceptions on democracy and development of some 10,000 people. The Brisbane CHOGM was originally planned for late 2001, and for the first time a Commonwealth People's Festival was planned alongside, and in the same building. The postponement of the CHOGM meant that the experiment's potential was unproven. Nevertheless the Coolum CHOGM of 2002 adopted the High Level Review report, which included significant statements on the need for the official Commonwealth to work more closely with Commonwealth civil society. The Abuja CHOGM in 2003 saw the closest engagement to date between civil society and the official Commonwealth, with a fourth Commonwealth NGO forum (now re-named a Commonwealth Civil Society Meeting), a People's Forum, and a People's Market - all wonderfully organised - preceded by five or six regional civil society consultations and a dialogue between officials and civil society representatives immediately before the Committee of the Whole.

There had thus been a rapid acceleration and development of the relationship between the official and unofficial Commonwealths at recent CHOGMs. There had also been significant developments at other gatherings of the official Commonwealth. It was now commonplace for ministerial meetings to be connected to parallel or related civil society meetings, and indeed for civil society organisations to be able to make some input into ministerial meetings. The recent Education Ministers' meeting in Edinburgh provided a good example, and Finance Ministers' meetings were now also accompanied by civil society gatherings. There had been an increase in civil society involvement in other Commonwealth activities, as well. For example, civil society representatives were now included in election monitoring teams as a matter of course, rather than as an afterthought.

The increasing involvement of civil society representatives was also a characteristic of the Commonwealth Foundation. Since 2000, civil society organisations had been represented on the Foundation's policy committee, and it was likely that a committee chaired by Ayo Oke, which was looking at the Foundation's governance on behalf of the Board of Governors, would recommend civil society involvement as members of the Board of Governors. In terms of the Commonwealth Foundation's work, the former two-tier approach to civil society organisations - the tendency to deal with the pan-Commonwealth professional organisations which the Foundation had been set up to support separately from indigenous civil society organisations - was gradually being replaced by a better integration of these two communities. This extended, for instance, to the Foundation's arts and culture portfolio, with arts and culture now being seen as an important expression of civil society values across the Commonwealth.

Remarkably, all these developments were taking place against a background of deeply ambivalent attitudes to civil society amongst many member governments. There were several Commonwealth governments which regarded civil society as an illegitimate, dangerous or unaccountable opposition. Although most Commonwealth governments saw civil society in a more positive light, there was still a marked disparity between government attitudes to civil society and government attitudes to the business sector, engagement with which was almost universally seen as valuable and necessary.

In Colin Ball's view, three questions applied to the official processes of the Commonwealth: what were they for? How should they work? And with what should they do it? Colin Ball himself, like many others, had become involved in the Commonwealth because he saw it as a force for good in a troubled world. In particular, it acted as a bridge-builder, and in theory brought together countries from the North and the South on an equal footing, to do things together, according to the needs and problems and circumstances of the time. While its power to do good directly was necessarily limited, it had great potential in the areas of advocacy and brokerage, and as a catalyst. It followed from the purpose of the Commonwealth that all its member countries should be on an equal footing, and that the 'ABC' countries should not seek to use the Commonwealth for unilateral purposes, or expect their votes to count for more because they put more in the kitty. It also followed that the official Commonwealth should work together with non-governmental partners, recognising that there were limits to what could be done by working through governments alone. The third question - with what? - gave the most cause for concern. The resources allocated to the Commonwealth were pitifully small, and as other speakers had pointed out, it was continually expected to take on more and more tasks. This problem bedevilled the official Commonwealth, and was a recipe for disaster.

Colin Ball did not agree with the suggestion that the Commonwealth Secretariat should imitate the UN by appointing plenipotentiaries to scour the world's trouble-spots while the Secretariat itself shrank even further. In his view, the Commonwealth needed to make the most of its differences from other international organisations, and of its own particular strengths. Of these, one of the most striking was the vibrancy of its civil society. Indeed, the resources of the unofficial Commonwealth far outstripped those of the official Commonwealth. What was needed was a multi-partnership approach, with the Commonwealth innovating by pooling government, private sector and civil society efforts into a coherent whole. This needed a change of mindset within the official Commonwealth, and deeper engagement with its partners. CHOGMs, for instance - which at present involved Heads of Government spending large amounts of time round a table not saying a word - could be re-organised to accommodate smaller groups, with much closer civil society and private sector involvement, as well as larger, closed sessions of the Heads as a whole.

In Colin Ball's view, a multi-partnership approach was a challenge, but an exciting one, with the potential for impact on many areas of key concern to Commonwealth citizens, whether security, globalisation, poverty, health or education. The Commonwealth was uniquely placed to promote the values of diversity, which were central to all issues of human security. In meeting this challenge, it was essential to include active youth initiatives, and to engage young people at all levels, in a way that the Commonwealth had hitherto failed to do. Engaging the imagination and enlisting the support of young people was the key to the renewal of the Commonwealth.

Jagadanada described the work of the Centre for Youth and Social Development in Orissa. The Centre had been founded twenty-five years previously, with the aim of triggering social mobilising processes around poverty issues in the most poverty-stricken state in India. It did this in three main ways. First, it worked on the ground with tribal and other communities on land and education issues. Secondly, it ran a capacity-building and training centre, so that lessons could be passed on in the hope of creating a critical mass in society for social change. Thirdly, it engaged in policy work, such as on issues of access to public services (which had been badly hit by Orissa's fiscal crisis) and on monitoring government institutions. The Centre was a partner in 'Social Watch', a coalition of civil society organisations formed to investigate the quality of public institutions from parliament downwards, and to encourage a new discourse in the country on the quality of India's institutions and the allocation of resources.

The Centre for Youth and Social Development (and Jagadananda personally) had been involved in pan-Commonwealth processes for about a decade. For many civil society organisations from developing countries, the issues of transparency, accountability and credibility were important. These helped ensure legitimacy in situations where civil society organisations were not always welcome. The Commonwealth had much to offer in the way of experience and best practice; indeed there was great potential within the Commonwealth for such exchanges of experience.

Civil society organisations such as the Centre for Youth and Social Development were confronted by a series of challenges in the early twenty-first century. The first was development, but it was important to be clear about what was meant by development. In Jagadanada's view, development meant far more than increasing a country's GDP, and there was a need for international organisations to take a far broader view of development. A second challenge was democracy, which again was about much more than electoral processes. In India, for instance, less than 50% of the electorate voted in national elections. The connecting thread between democracy and development, the themes articulated and addressed at Abuja, was freedom. Freedom encompassed human rights, and another challenge for civil society organisations was to ensure the adoption of affirmative action plans to help promote and protect human rights.

Civil society action was based around three main goals: innovation, interaction and influence. Within civil society organisations there was a tremendous accent on, and expertise in, finding innovative solutions to the problems of the day, whether they be to do with the environment, education, access to credit, or a range of other issues. Civil society action facilitated deeper interaction between different strata, peoples and countries. Indeed, the more positive interaction now taking place between India and Pakistan was largely made possible by the work of civil society organisations. Finally, civil society organisations had an important role to play in influencing local, national and international policies, and in monitoring and advancing the agenda around issues such as poverty. There had been a distinct movement in recent years in the scope of civil society action, from mainly philanthropic activities to influencing the serious underlying issues.

As Colin Ball had pointed out, much progress had been made in developing pan-Commonwealth civil society activities since the Harare meeting in 1991. Civil society organisations had engaged in fruitful discourse on a range of topics, such as democracy and good government, the environment, and sustainable development. Indeed, the interaction between civil society organisations had been one of the most striking expressions of the diversity and vitality of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Foundation was well positioned to facilitate civil society organisations learning from each other. Nevertheless this was largely uni-dimensional: it was happening mainly within civil society. The interactions between government and civil society, and between business and civil society, were still few. There was a need to extend these interactions, and to put in place mechanisms to ensure adequate follow-up. Civil society organisations had a huge amount of experience and expertise, which could be of real benefit to the 'official' Commonwealth in addressing the key issues of the day. While some progress had been made, the Commonwealth was in danger of falling behind other international organisations, such as the UN and the World Bank, in the way that it engaged with civil society. There had been several important affirmations by the 'official' Commonwealth of the importance of working with civil society organisations. The Commonwealth needed to close the gap between rhetoric and reality.

• There was much agreement with the speakers' emphasis on the vitality of the Commonwealth civil society sector. Indeed, it was suggested that civil society activity showed that, far from the Commonwealth dying, it was just the old forms and associations of the Commonwealth that were dying, while the Commonwealth itself was only now really beginning to come alive. It was also pointed out that the vitality of its civil society sector was one of the great strengths of the Commonwealth as compared with other international organisations. There was, for instance, a striking contrast with La Francophonie.
• Nevertheless there was also much agreement with Colin Ball's contrast between the way governments interacted with business and the way they interacted with civil society, including the media. The Commonwealth Business Forum in Nigeria had numerous Heads of Government wandering around, meeting and talking with delegates. This was an opportunity denied at the Civil Society Meeting, or the Media Centre.
• Referring to previous discussion of the question, 'What is the Commonwealth for?', one participant suggested that civil society organisations and governments alike should ask a different question, 'How can we use it?'. The Commonwealth was there, and it had tremendous potential. There were many parts of the Commonwealth where people were constructively looking at how they might express themselves through and gain benefit from the Commonwealth. At Abuja, there had been a significant involvement of the business sector even though there was no short-term business benefit. Businessmen realised that there were long-term benefits to be had from the kind of interactions which the Commonwealth encompassed and facilitated. There had long been too much talk of the Commonwealth dying - though this was not to say that the Commonwealth's structures did not need to be constantly examined and reformed.
• Several participants voiced agreement with Colin Ball's point about the absence of youth from so many Commonwealth deliberations, and the need to rectify it. Without a much better engagement with young people, the Commonwealth certainly would not flourish and eventually would die out. When questioned about their priorities, many young people mentioned topics that were central to Commonwealth activity, but towards the Commonwealth itself they felt - if anything - frustration and alienation. Very little was being done either by national governments or by the Commonwealth itself to educate young people about the Commonwealth or engage them in its activities. The concerns of young people needed to be integrated into Commonwealth activities at all levels, and not treated as a separate issue.
• There was also much support for the closer integration of civil society organisations in official Commonwealth activities. What had come across very strongly at Abuja and elsewhere was the desire of civil society organisations to have their expertise used. The official Commonwealth should embrace civil society organisations in all of its work, and not just where it was itself lacking expertise. There was a mutual interest in maintaining the Commonwealth.
• On the other hand it was suggested that, as well as attitudes in governments and business needing to change, civil society organisations themselves needed to undergo a re-orientation, to make themselves seen as necessary partners for governments and business. There was incredible liveliness and energy in civil society organisations, but the trick was to channel this constructively, like converting solar energy into power. Civil society organisations needed to show that they could create marketable concepts which governments and business could use, and partnerships which could respond to concerns shared by all.

Richard Bourne said that the question was often asked, 'Is the Commonwealth dying?'. Perhaps another question needed to be asked: 'If it is, is it our responsibility to do something about it?'. He himself believed it was. The Commonwealth stood for values and offered opportunities that were too valuable to lose.

The need to create partnerships between the official Commonwealth and civil society might be described as a case of bringing the new world in to redress the balance of the old. The real background here was the gradual decline in the official Commonwealth's resources, such that the Secretariat now had constantly to make a small x and a small y make a very big z. The question was, could civil society's youth and vitality and constructive antagonism be converted into something positive that could rescue the official Commonwealth which governments no longer seemed to want to do much with, and which they had progressively starved of resources?

Civil society's delivery capacity and ability to work in partnership was as yet largely untested. Equally, the official Commonwealth's willingness really to make the partnership work was untried. There was a danger that difficulties and divergences might lead to disillusionment. Some things had not worked well at Abuja, including and especially difficulties over getting civil society views into the media. More careful thought needed to go into what exactly the official and unofficial Commonwealths could do together. The Edinburgh Education Ministers' meeting had, as well as engaging civil society organisations to an unprecedented degree in its processes, produced an action plan which included civil society actions. It would therefore be interesting to see what came of the closer relationships fostered by the Edinburgh meeting.

Colin Ball said that differences of culture in the government, business and civil society worlds had tended to constitute an obstacle to dialogue, at least between civil society and the other two. Nevertheless, it was becoming increasingly apparent that such differences could be the source of creative partnerships rather than confrontation. Only by working together with civil society and pooling resources could the official Commonwealth begin to tackle otherwise inaccessible problems. With a new Chair of the Commonwealth, personifying and calling for a new approach, there was perhaps a good basis from which to innovate creatively.

Jagadananda said that the idea of partnership needed to be taken much more seriously on all sides. Civil society organisations were often seen by governments and business as beneficiaries of their largesse. This was quite wrong. The official Commonwealth and the private sector had much to learn from dialogue with civil society organisations, and to gain from partnership with them. There was tremendous potential for good in an approach that pooled the efforts of governments, business and civil society, in pursuit of shared goals.

Session V: The Commonwealth's Agenda Post-CHOGM

Chair:
Stephen Cox
Chairman, The Round Table

Speakers:
Alexandra Jones
Director, Strategic Planning and Evaluation Unit, Commonwealth Secretariat
Stuart Mole
Director-General, Royal Commonwealth Society

Respondent:
Peter Lyon
Former Editor, The Round Table

Alexandra Jones said that she had been much involved in civil society organisations and had a great deal of sympathy for their positions and aspirations, although in this session she would be speaking to a certain extent with her Commonwealth Secretariat hat on. Many previous speakers had questioned the extent to which the mandates and directives issued at CHOGMs were operationalised and prioritised. Within the Commonwealth Secretariat there was in fact quite a robust and systematic process for translating mandates into programmes. At Abuja there had been a tight linkage between the expert group report and the final mandates and communiqué, and the Secretariat had subsequently drawn up a four-year strategic plan to operationalise the Heads' agreements.

After any major meeting of the Commonwealth - whether CHOGMs or ministerial meetings - a follow-up table was compiled, with details of time-frames, objectives and indicators. The Secretariat reported annually to Heads of Government and biennially at CHOGMs, and it had been agreed that the Secretariat would from now on also report quadrennially, on progress made.

At Abuja, the Secretariat had reported on the progress of the High Level Review and Coolum mandates, and had been able to show that it had at least got off first base on every single mandate (some of which had extremely long time-frames), and was indeed well-advanced on many. The Secretariat had robust systems in place for tracking, documenting and reporting on its activities. This degree of transparency and information-sharing was important if the Secretariat was to justify what it did with its resources.

In Alexandra Jones's view, the Abuja CHOGM had been a successful one, and it was not the case that the Zimbabwe 'cuckoo' had 'pushed all the other fledglings out of the nest'. The unsung success story of the CHOGM was the progress made in the areas of trade, investment, development, and the Commonwealth's response to globalisation. In the democracy-development duality, more emphasis had been given at Abuja to the development component, to complement Coolum's emphasis on democracy and good government. The convening of a Trade Ministers' mission to attempt to revive the Doha agenda was a notable step forward, and arguably something that only the Commonwealth could do. In an important step, the Heads of Government had included in the Aso Rock Declaration a commitment to sustain the resources supporting the work of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. There had also been significant statements on debt sustainability and finance facilities, and on corruption and the repatriation of its proceeds. On health, there had been important discussion of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, and while it was recognised that Commonwealth resources were, in some sectors, under the critical levels needed to make a direct impact, there was a major challenge for the Commonwealth in attempting to leverage resources through strategic partnerships to help tackle these problems.

The Heads of Government had also made significant statements on women's rights, youth initiatives, and the role of civil society, and on climate change, terrorism and the proliferation of small arms - though it was unclear how these latter statements could be translated into effective programmes in the Commonwealth context. The question of Pakistan's continued suspension was also discussed - and it was interesting to note both the very different tenor of the discussions, and the different response of the government concerned, as compared to Zimbabwe. Interwoven in the text of the Aso Rock Declaration were some important references to the governance of the Commonwealth, and it was clear that the Secretariat would need constantly to re-evaluate and streamline its governance arrangements if it were to fulfil its increased mandates without any significant additional resources.

The Abuja CHOGM had shown the vital importance of high-quality work in the host country ahead of the meeting, both in putting in place the arrangements for the meeting and in putting together the elements of a draft declaration. The work done by the Nigerian government had been exceptionally good. Nevertheless the extent to which other issues were squeezed by discussions on Zimbabwe perhaps indicated a need to revisit the question of how CHOGMs should be programmed and managed. There was perhaps also a need for more considered and well thought-out mechanisms for carrying through agreements and principles between CHOGMs. The Commonwealth's arrangements had sometimes appeared rather too ad hoc.

The fact that it had become known how individual governments had aligned on particular issues at Abuja suggested that there might be a trend towards a more voting-based approach at future meetings. This perhaps signalled a more robust approach to certain issues. There were other questions surrounding the arrangements for official Commonwealth meetings, one of which was raised by the increasingly obvious fact that some smaller member states did not have the facilities to host CHOGMs. There were also various issues surrounding ministerial meetings and how these fitted into Commonwealth programmes and activities, and the Heads had requested the Secretary-General to report on this question at the next CHOGM.

Against a background of constant pressure on its resources, the Commonwealth Secretariat's task was to translate its mandates into programmes, and to prioritise realistically between them. This involved real issues of micro-management. The Secretariat's agenda had always to be formulated with regard not only to the opportunities for change but also to the constraints. Nevertheless it was important not to lose sight of the bigger picture - what the Commonwealth could do. The Commonwealth had made significant contributions in many areas. It was important to celebrate and build on those achievements.

Stuart Mole said that Alexandra Jones had concentrated largely on what would be the Commonwealth's agenda after Abuja. He would focus more on what it ought to be. He would do so under four headings: priorities and resources, partnerships, the new generation, and leadership and vision.

The question, 'What is the Commonwealth for?', had been raised and addressed by many previous speakers. In Stuart Mole's view, what indeed may once have been no more than a haphazard collection of the survivors of empire had evolved into a very worthwhile and potentially significant organisation. Its informality, empathy, community of language, and commitment to consensus ensured that it could make an important contribution in encouraging connection and communication in an increasingly globalised world. Its shared body of ideas and commitment to shared values equipped it to make an important impact in the global debate. It was clear that the Commonwealth would never be like the UN or the EU, and it would destroy what it did have to offer if it tried. Rather than emulating these other organisations, the Commonwealth should play to its strengths by finding niche areas in which it enjoyed comparative advantages. In Stuart Mole's view, this did not amount to a recipe for decline; rather it amounted to a recipe for enhanced significance. Nevertheless the issue of resources needed to be tackled head-on. The Commonwealth Science Council had now been wound up - despite the fact that it had a number of good projects still running. The education and health departments of the Commonwealth Secretariat were very close to or below the level of staffing needed merely to sustain their current programmes. The Economic Affairs Division had also now become very small - despite the increased salience of economic questions in Commonwealth commitments. It was clear that at each CHOGM the Heads were impressed enough with the Commonwealth's potential to direct it to do more - but reluctant to give it the resources necessary to do all those things effectively. The diversity of the Commonwealth's activities reflected in large part the diversity of its membership: different countries wanted different things from it. But unless the Secretariat could retain a residual and sufficient core capacity in each area it would lose its credibility.

Partnerships might to an extent help to overcome the limitations of the official Commonwealth's resources. As had been pointed out earlier in the meeting, the Commonwealth included an astonishing range of civil society organisations. Even the pan-Commonwealth organisations - a very small part of the overall picture - collectively had budgets considerably in excess of the official Commonwealth. The Abuja CHOGM had been a great triumph in the way that it had fostered interconnections between the official and unofficial Commonwealths, to a large extent dispelling the doubts that had grown after Coolum. Great strides had also been made by the Commonwealth Secretariat in developing partnerships. Whether these interconnections could develop into an effective working relationship across the Commonwealth was much more doubtful. In contrast to their attitudes to business, some Commonwealth governments viewed civil society with extreme suspicion. Part of the problem was no doubt that in some cases civil society organisations adopted inappropriately and counter-productively aggressive approaches. Nevertheless there was a need for a sea-change in the attitudes of governments themselves. The official Commonwealth needed to engage much more, and much better, with civil society, including the media.

Without bringing in the new generation, there would be no future for the Commonwealth. Again there had been some progress, and there had been well-organised and stimulating youth fora both at the Edinburgh Education Ministers' meeting and at the Abuja CHOGM. Nevertheless there was little follow-up and little thought given to the longer-term. Indeed, participants in Commonwealth youth fora sometimes appeared to have little further connection with Commonwealth activities. There was a need to maintain this interaction, and to integrate it into all levels of Commonwealth decision-making. Young people would not sustain the Commonwealth unless they could feel involved, and that the Commonwealth represented their concerns.

There were lots of things that the Commonwealth could do, but whether it was enabled to do them effectively depended on the existence of leadership and political will. Without this, the Commonwealth was surely doomed to slip into obscurity. There was much hope that the position of Chair of the Commonwealth would be much more substantive under President Obasanjo than under his two predecessors, though whether the position had enough political capital to confront another issue like Zimbabwe was not clear. Similarly, Abuja had been a personal triumph for the Secretary-General, but his office had undoubtedly been weakened by divisions over the Zimbabwe issue; given that his role depended to such a large extent on the trust and support of member governments, it seemed likely that in future the Secretary-General would be much more wary of putting himself on the line. CMAG - which had been one of the most hopeful initiatives of the Commonwealth - was also arguably now in decline. Amongst national governments, there seemed little evidence of wholehearted commitment to the Commonwealth, and of the big ideas and vision needed to transform the Commonwealth and to ensure it fulfilled its potential. Much could be learned from the way that Dr. Mahathir had enlisted the Commonwealth and harnessed it to his own national goals. There needed to be much more of that from national governments. Political leadership was the key to raising the Commonwealth's profile, and to transforming its perception in the media and amongst the public at large.

The Commonwealth had many success stories as well as more worrying indicators. But in order for it to adapt to change, to fight off dangerous reductionism, and to fulfil something of its real potential, the key question of resources needed to be addressed, partnerships needed to be built, the new generation needed to be involved, and leadership and political will needed to be shown at the highest levels.

• There was much agreement that the question of resources was central to the Commonwealth's future. The resources gap was both glaring and growing. Some participants suggested that there was perhaps a need to address the particular concerns of the ABC countries. In the UK - which contributed 30% of the Secretariat's resources - the old days when the Commonwealth had a high, benevolent and largely unquestioned profile were long gone. What could be done top persuade the ABC countries to commit more resources to the Commonwealth? Stuart Mole responded by saying that as far as the UK was concerned, he did wonder whether the Labour government's initial enthusiasm for the Commonwealth had diminished, and whether the Prime Minister in particular was willing to tolerate the sometimes slow and arcane workings of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless there were many positive aspects. For instance, DfID had been willing to commit resources over and above the block grant, for specific ventures. Alexandra Jones was also reasonably positive. The formula for the UK's funding of Commonwealth institutions meant that the UK would automatically give more if other countries did, and there was no reason to think that the UK would not be happy to do so. Both DfID and the FCO had come up with extra funding for such things as evaluation studies and the recent Education Ministers' meeting at Edinburgh (which had been generously funded and well run). The Commonwealth's strengths and activities were compatible with a number of priority areas for the UK government, such as the WTO trade talks, the International Finance Facility, and NEPAD. Like other ABC countries, the UK did want to see value for money. Nevertheless if the Commonwealth Secretariat could prove that it was providing value for money (and Alexandra Jones was sure that it could), then it was not over-optimistic to assume that it could make a case for more. In Alexandra Jones's view this was a fair wager.
• Some participants took issue with Stuart Mole's prognosis for the positions of Chair and Secretary-General. It was suggested that President Obasanjo looked set to be a particularly active Chair of the Commonwealth who would apply his political leadership in the Commonwealth's service, particularly in the areas of good offices and the healing of wounds in southern Africa, and in the development of the Commonwealth's engagement with civil society. Similarly, the Secretary-General had emerged strengthened by the Abuja CHOGM, with his re-election confirming his authority. Alexandra Jones thought that the Commonwealth was extremely fortunate to have President Obasanjo as Chair, since he was extremely well-equipped for the bridge-building work that would be necessary in the coming months. Stuart Mole said he was encouraged by this response to his argument, and also hoped that President Obasanjo would prove a strong Chair; the position had clearly been under-utilised since its foundation in 1999.
• Noting that the Chair of the Commonwealth had four times as long in office as the President of the EU Council, and twenty-four times as long as the President of the UN Security Council, one participant suggested that such innovations as the Troika might be more needed in the cases of other international organisations than in the Commonwealth's. It was arguable that the Troika and possibly also CMAG had outlived their purposes as major elements in the evolution of the Commonwealth as a rules-based organisation, and that a more appropriate and powerful driving force would be a partnership between an active Chair and the Secretary-General. Other participants supported this line of argument. It was pointed out that the Troika was only a recent innovation, and hardly part of the established Commonwealth machinery.
• Support was voiced for Stuart Mole's point about the importance of building partnerships. In many areas the very scale of the problems that confronted the Commonwealth suggested that the official Commonwealth could not do much on its own. Had it not been for the HIV/AIDS epidemic, for instance, it was questionable whether the Commonwealth Secretariat would still have any operations in the area of health at all; and what it could do on its own was extremely limited. Here there was an opportunity for a new approach, much more NGO-led, in which all the Commonwealth elements could be pulled together to develop imaginative and innovative programmes to tackle the health crisis.
• One participant, in referring to the evaluation work done by the Commonwealth Secretariat and outlined by Alexandra Jones, suggested that it would be good if, after a period of confidentiality, some of this information could be released in the interests of transparency, for instance on the Secretariat's website.
• A number of participants picked up on the theme of transparency and information-sharing. The media interest in the Commonwealth was diminishing throughout its member states, and there was little awareness of the broader work of the Commonwealth. When the media did turn the spotlight on the Commonwealth, it often did so in unhelpful ways. One reason was that information on the Commonwealth was not forthcoming. There was a need for a radical re-assessment of how the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Commonwealth Foundation, and other Commonwealth bodies got their messages out. The Ingram report on the Commonwealth and the media, which had been endorsed by the Heads at the Edinburgh CHOGM, appeared to have been left on the shelf. Many of its recommendations remained valid.

Alexandra Jones agreed with much that had been said about the increased importance of the relationship between the Chair of the Commonwealth and the Secretary-General. As for the Troika and CMAG, she thought that the Commonwealth did need structures through which to apply rules and make judgements, and that it should not rely wholly on ad hoc or temporary bodies. She also agreed with much of what had been said about the need to build strategic partnerships with civil society and business. The fight against HIV/AIDS, for instance, called for a concerted strategy which would encompass affordable drugs and better health facilities, education, and the empowerment of women, to name but three key elements of what was needed.

Stuart Mole thought that it would be interesting to see how the relationship between the Chair and the Secretary-General developed. He still thought that both would be preoccupied for some time with healing wounds, and would have less inclination to plunge into a new conflict. The Troika was effectively moribund, though it was conceivable that in different circumstances it might be resurrected. CMAG was clearly weakened, but it would be a loss if it disappeared altogether. The problems with it were mainly due to its restricted mandate, and the need to look beyond coups and the installation of military regimes. As Alexandra Jones had suggested, there was still a need for structures to apply rules and make judgements between CHOGMs.

Peter Lyon said that he thought it was right to spend time questioning the future of the Commonwealth. The extent of public ignorance and indifference towards the Commonwealth was striking. He had been staying some 18 miles from Abuja at the time of the CHOGM, and nearly all the people he spoke to knew virtually nothing about the big meeting which was happening up the road. He had also given lectures at several Nigerian universities, but had been firmly steered away from the Commonwealth and towards other aspects of international relations. At one lecture, a question from the floor about whether the Commonwealth was anything more than a new name for the old empire drew spontaneous applause, and Peter Lyon had been forcibly struck by the ignorance about the Commonwealth shown by his lecturer hosts as well as students. At the CHOGM itself there had been very poor arrangements for the provision of information and documentation. There was a grotesque information deficiency surrounding the Commonwealth, which had to be tackled if the Commonwealth to survive.

Peter Lyon agreed with much that had been said by the other speakers. Alexandra Jones had presented a persuasive case for believing that the Commonwealth Secretariat had robust systems in place for ensuring implementation of mandates and principles. Stuart Mole had argued convincingly that in order to flourish the Commonwealth needed to shift much more from a governments' Commonwealth to a people's Commonwealth. Different views had been expressed over the future characteristics of Commonwealth activity, but it was clear that the relationship between the Chair and the Secretary-General would in future be critical.

There were a number of important issues which hadn't been discussed. One was the question of future new members of the Commonwealth. Another was the regional dimension. With Malta and Cyprus shortly to join the UK as a link between the Commonwealth and the EU, with the Caribbean and other regions feeling marginalised by the dispute over Zimbabwe, and with SADC countries feeling the need to issue their own statement on the Zimbabwean issue, how the Commonwealth interacted with its regional groupings would become of greater importance in the near future. The particular needs and problems of small states were also likely to assume a renewed importance with Malta to host the next CHOGM. At the same time, there was a need to look more closely at what the Commonwealth had to offer large states, and it was particularly important to get India more closely involved. Yet another issue which had not been addressed was the problem of 'failed', or as Peter Lyon preferred to term them 'flawed' states. There had been very little discussion of this category, which included a number of Commonwealth states, both large and small.

Lee Kuan Yew had once described CHOGMs as 'seminars for statesmen'. Peter Lyon thought this was no longer true, if it ever had been. CHOGMs, and indeed the Commonwealth itself, existed for many different purposes, and political leaders brought to their meetings rather different assumptions and objectives. The Commonwealth's task was to meet those objectives without diluting its work to the extent that it faded into irrelevance.

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