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Cumberland Lodge Conference 2002 Report

The Commonwealth after 11 September 2001

Cumberland Lodge, 14-15 January 2002

Session I: The Commonwealth and the 'war on terrorism'

Chair:
Alexandra Jones
Chair, The Round Table; Director-Designate, Strategic Planning and Evaluation Unit, Commonwealth Secretariat

Speakers:
Indrajit Hazra
Journalist (Hindustan Times) and novelist
Stuart Mole
Director-General, Royal Commonwealth Society

Alexandra Jones opened the session by saying that the events of 11 September 2001 would live on in infamy. Hundreds of millions of people worldwide had been personally affected by witnessing (through the vicarious medium of television) the horrific deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. In the immediate aftermath, 11 September appeared as one of those events that would change the course of world history. With the passage of time, a clearer perspective was possible. Had the world changed, permanently? If so, in what ways? And what would be the likely shape of the resulting international order? The events of 11 September had had a direct impact on the Commonwealth, leading to the postponement of the CHOGM due to be held in Brisbane in October 2001, and other knock-on effects on Commonwealth activities. What would be the more long-lasting effects of the events of 11 September on the Commonwealth? What role could it play in helping to overcome the threat posed by terrorism? And what would be its role or roles in the new international environment?

Stuart Mole said that history rarely made neat turns. With the benefit of hindsight, historians had questioned the significance even of such dates (in the British context) as 1066 or 1914. Undoubtedly the same would be true of 11 September 2001. The events of that horrific day derived much of their significance from trends already apparent and others not yet fully apparent. Nevertheless the immediate impact of those events, the enormity of their consequences, and the extent to which they had engendered change in the international environment, ensured that they would be seen by many as marking a turning point.

The immediate damage to the US economy inflicted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September had been variously estimated at $100-300 billion, excluding military expenditure; the knock-on effects, and the damage to other countries, were as yet unquantifiable. The scale, omnipresence, and unpredictability of the terrorist threat had been made clear. The world now lived in the shadow of terrorism. The subsequent reaction to the attacks, including the war in Afghanistan, were the clearest sign to date that the end of the Cold War had led to an age of the pax Americana. America's awesome military might had been confirmed. Just as significantly, signs of an American retreat into isolationism - evident in some of the early actions of the Bush administration - had been decisively reversed, though, with just 5% of the world's population and 21% of its economic resources, it was clear that America neither could nor should perform the role of international policeman unaided, nor do so unilaterally. There was a need for more multilateral contact and agreement, not less. Another consequence of the events of 11 September was to have produced a clearer firebreak between countries which unequivocally took a stand against international terrorism and those which were beyond civility. Alongside a new world order there was also a new world disorder, and there had to be a clear distinction between the values characterizing each. Perhaps the most momentous significance of the events of 11 September was the fact that they symbolized the birth of a new era in international relations, characterized on the one hand by the pervasive effects of globalization and its disintegrative effects on national sovereignty, and on the other by its counterweight, the striking out for identity by ethnic, cultural, or religious groups. Already it was clear that separatism, intolerance, collapsed states, failed states, and increasing pressures on all nation states, were amongst the most serious problems faced by the international community.

The Commonwealth's immediate response to the events of 11 September had been lamentable. CHOGM was a unique global forum for discussing issues of concern to its member states, and much good could have come from meeting in Brisbane as scheduled. While the reasons given by some heads (notably from the Caribbean) for not attending were entirely understandable, the response of others seemed to indicate a regrettable and wholly wrong assumption of the Commonwealth's irrelevance. There then followed what Derek Ingram had rightly called an 'appalling silence'. When the Commonwealth finally did speak out - on 25 October - it did so with a robust statement making clear that countries supporting terrorism had no place in the Commonwealth. But who by then was listening?

The Commonwealth did have an important role to play in facing the challenge of international terrorism. First, it could bring the experience of its own members to bear. Numerous Commonwealth states had been affected by terrorist actions, and some of them had successfully contained terrorist threats; it was important for them to put their experience at the service of the wider international community. Secondly, the Commonwealth could contribute directly to the international front against terrorism. In particular, it was hoped that the ministerial group on terrorism, due to meet in London at the end of January, would identify practical ways in which the Commonwealth could facilitate measures to counter the threat of international terrorism. Thirdly, the Commonwealth, as an organization with unique democratic credentials, had a duty to address the political implications of the terrorist threat, and to take a lead in articulating the values which held its members together, including tolerance and the welcoming acceptance of diversity. Fourthly, the Commonwealth should continue to address the roots of terrorism, namely poverty and injustice, and it should redouble its commitment to facilitating development and social equity. Fifthly, the Commonwealth should continue to pursue its bridge-building, conflict resolution and conflict prevention roles, through the good offices work of the Secretariat, CMAG, and other mechanisms.

In an age of disintegration, the Commonwealth was a powerful force for a more integrated world. A unique association of free, open and vigilant democracies, with strong civil societies, committed to multilateralism and international order, the Commonwealth represented a major asset. It was to be hoped that Commonwealth leaders in the twenty-first century would make full use of its potential, and not just use it as a convenient umbrella for transient or particular concerns.

Indrajit Hazra offered an Indian perspective on the events of 11 September. India had of course suffered much from terrorism, including recently the attack on the Indian Parliament. It had come as no surprise in India that the 11 September attacks had been described as the work of Islamic fundamentalists. In India, as now in the wider world, the words 'Islamic' and 'terrorist' appeared to stick together as if by some Velcro effect. But the two words were not intrinsically linked. As many people had pointed out in the wake of the 11 September attacks, the terrorists' actions directly contradicted the teachings of Islam, as understood by the vast majority of its adherents worldwide. It was important to disentangle the two. The connection between Islam and terrorism had been consciously made and nurtured by forces seeking to make political gain. It was necessary, both to understand terrorism and to counter it, to cut through the confusion.

'Islamic' terrorism was in fact no different from previous terrorisms, and should be seen as the latest incarnation of terrorism, not as something qualitatively different. Al-Qaeeda had obvious similarities to the IRA and the Red Brigade. Terrorism occurred when a small group of people resolved to use violence and subversion of the law to pursue ideological aims. Most usually it occurred when that group had little hope of achieving their aims by democratic or peaceful means; part of the terrorist's hope was by his violent act to wake up 'his' people to throw off their oppression.

It had long been the case that terrorists had quoted ideology or holy scripture to further their cause. Carlo Bianco, one of Mazzini's followers, had written in 1833 of the 'sacred enthusiasm' which led individuals to commit acts of violence for the 'sublime purpose of regeneration'. The issue to be exploited then was the nascent ideology of the nation-state. For bin Laden, it was the Islamic renaissance. Onto this he had bolted an anti-Western ideology - similar in some respects to Gaddafi's use of concepts borrowed from Frantz Fanon - reviving the idea of the 'evil empire', and preying on the pent-up resentment of many in developing countries towards the West. Many of his claims - to be following a higher law, to be striking back against injustice, to be following a duty to replace a corrupt regime with the rule of the just - had resonances stretching way back through the history of terrorism.

There was a need to understand why terrorism happened - that is, why people should allow themselves to be led astray by a perverted ideology. Albert Camus wrote that terrorism was a selfish act which pretended to be selfless. The alienation which allowed this to happen had to be addressed. It was also important to build bridges, most importantly now with the religious and cultural milieux which had given rise to the latest incarnation of terrorism, so that they would not be exploited in the same way in the future. Along with ways of dealing with the terrorists, ways needed to be found of keeping links with the fence-sitters, and those who were potential supporters of the terrorists. The war against terrorism was above all an ideological war.

• There was much discussion of the postponement of CHOGM and the Commonwealth's 'appalling silence' until the end of October. This had seemed in many quarters to have signified the Commonwealth's irrelevance; certainly the Commonwealth made no impact on the international stage until very late in the day. A number of participants endorsed Stuart Mole's observation that CHOGM would have been the ideal forum to discuss the terrorist threat and the international community's response to it. It was suggested that even if the full CHOGM could not have gone ahead, some sort of meeting should have been possible, with the aid of tele- and video-conferencing. Several participants thought that the Commonwealth's response to the events of 11 September had shown it at its most cumbrous, with the Secretariat having to engage in consultation with 54 governments before making a belated statement. A number of participants thought that there had in particular been a failure to make use of the position of Chair of the Commonwealth.
• One participant thought that it was regrettable that the Commonwealth had made a declaration in the wake of the 11 September attacks. Commonwealth countries had lived with terrorism - whether internal, international, or cross-border - for decades, with very little being said or done about it. All of a sudden, the Commonwealth was taking note. There was a danger that some countries would see the Commonwealth as jumping to an American tune. Stuart Mole disagreed: the Commonwealth had been trying to get the problem discussed for many years. It was of course disquieting that the loss of life in previous incidents had not made more impact. Nevertheless, the events of 11 September had produced a sea-change in attitudes on the part of governments. It was important to maintain the global consensus.
• It was noted that Indrajit Hazra had not referred to the Commonwealth at all in his discussion of terrorism. Was this perhaps indicative of a wider failure of the Commonwealth to engage with the concerns of the larger member states? Indrajit Hazra responded by agreeing that in India the Commonwealth hardly came into the picture in terms of government-to-government relations, but that its role in facilitating people-to-people interaction was more widely appreciated.
• A number of participants commented on the turnaround in the international community's attitude to Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Would there be attempts to enable Pakistan to resume membership before it became a democratic state? And how would the crisis affect attempts to return Pakistan to the path of democracy?
• It was suggested that education played a key role in destroying the roots of terrorism. Extremism thrived where there was a breakdown of secular education. The media also held a particular responsibility to undermine stereotypes and promote tolerance. Indrajit Hazra agreed, and thought that part of the problem for the media lay in its inevitable (and market-driven) propensity to sensationalize. A dispute about property rights in Uttar Pradesh would only make front page news if it had a religious element that could be played up.
• One participant wondered if there was any need for a separate ministerial group on terrorism. The original purpose of CMAG had been to promote the rule of law, just and accountable government, and human rights. The terrorists challenged all these, and arguably action against them could come within the purview of CMAG. Stuart Mole responded by saying that there would inevitably be areas of overlap, but that there was one major difference between CMAG and the new ministerial group, which was that CMAG was concerned with individual states, whereas the ministerial group would seek to act in support of international mechanisms against trans-national organizations which might be permeating individual member states (including the UK).
• There was some discussion of the role of civil society in addressing the issues raised by the events of 11 September. It was suggested that in the long term the only real insurance against the growth of terrorism was the empowerment of individuals, and the growth of active civil societies and open democracies. Indrajit Hazra agreed: as Albert Camus had said, terrorism sprang from despair of personal freedom. People-to-people contacts were also important in tackling the roots of violence and hatred.

Session II: Will Coolum open a new CHOGM chapter?

Chair:
Derek Ingram
President Emeritus, Commonwealth Journalists' Association

Speakers:
HE Sir Ronald M. Sanders
Chief Foreign Affairs Representative with Ministerial Rank and High Commissioner to the UK, Antigua and Barbuda
Adam Robertson First Secretary (Political), Australia High Commission

Derek Ingram opened the session by saying that the postponement of CHOGM had created a unique situation, and would result in a very different kind of summit when the Heads of Government finally met at Coolum. Their meeting there would take the form almost wholly of a retreat. This could turn out to be a very good thing. CHOGMs had been growing in size and complexity for many years. But the essence of a CHOGM was the informal meeting of heads of government, discussing issues of common concern. The Coolum CHOGM seemed set to be interesting for other reasons, too - Zimbabwe (though Mugabe himself was not likely to be there, immediately before the presidential election), Pakistan (Musharraf would of course not be there, though there had been rumours of attempts to have him invited as a guest), possibly also because of recent events in Fiji and Zambia, and of course the report of the High Level Review Group. The latter had been subject to a leak of mammoth proportions, and had been much criticized from all quarters: in its current form it would be a huge disappointment. But how might it be stiffened before the CHOGM, and how might the heads of government themselves re-cast it?

HE Sir Ronald Sanders said that he agreed entirely with Derek Ingram's point about the importance of the retreat. He had been attending CHOGMs since 1975, and had watched them grow out of all proportion. The early meetings of Commonwealth leaders had been characterized by an informality of exchange which derived in part from their common educational experience and their common language. The retreat - discovered almost accidentally at Singapore - had been introduced to retain and recreate some of that spirit. He well remembered the importance that Pierre Trudeau attached to the retreat, as a device to enable heads of government to speak freely and frankly about their concerns, and to listen and respond to other heads' points of view, without set texts, long speeches, fixed agendas, and officials. The very brief and issue-restricted retreat at Edinburgh had been a hopeless occasion in terms of the scope for informal interaction between the heads of government. Some of the ground was made up at Durban. But he hoped that the Coolum CHOGM would set a pattern for the future.

If the Commonwealth met at Coolum in March 2002 and Zimbabwe was still a member, in the High Commissioner's view the Commonwealth would be sending a very bad signal to the world. There was a legitimate case in Zimbabwe for land redistribution (as also would increasingly be the case in South Africa). The concentration of land ownership in Zimbabwe was a legitimate grievance and redistribution was necessary, but it should be conducted in a sensible and legal fashion, without violence, and with reasonable compensation - not through thuggery and intimidation. But the reality of Mugabe's Zimbabwe was that the force of oppression was directed against the community as a whole, and not just against white farmers. He was persistently violating the Harare principles, and did so shamelessly. The Caribbean view (informed by their own experience of exploitation and discrimination, and by their support for the liberation movements in southern Africa) was that there could not be one set of standards and principles for white countries and another for black - that Mugabe could not be allowed to adopt the methods of Ian Smith. Repeated efforts by the Secretary-General had been rebuffed. Zimbabwe failed even to receive a Commonwealth delegation. It was clearly not observing the accepted norms and obligations of Commonwealth membership. So why did it remain - and why was it allowed to remain - in the Commonwealth?

Though it was unlikely, the High Commissioner thought that the recent escalation of tension between Pakistan and India should also be addressed by the CHOGM. He personally had been horrified that in a serious confrontation between two Commonwealth member states (albeit one suspended), threatening regional and indeed global stability, the Commonwealth apparently had made no significant attempts to play a mediating role. There was something wrong with an organization that did not seek to help resolve disputes between two of its members. The draft report of the High Level Review Group had been particularly feeble. 'The Commonwealth is committed to respecting the well-established practice of keeping bilateral issues between member states out of Commonwealth multilateral discussions', it noted. This was both ridiculous and unrealistic. It was impossible to ignore serious disagreements between member states.

The High Commissioner hoped that the particular problems of small states would also feature in the discussions at Coolum. Small states now represented a significant proportion of Commonwealth members. There had recently been a proposal to form an association of small states. The High Commissioner himself thought that this would be an ant on an elephant's back: it would have a nuisance value, but little more. The best way forward was to work within existing international organizations, especially the Commonwealth, which had shown itself willing to represent effectively the interests of its small state members. If small states could persuade their larger fellow members to argue on their behalf in international institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization and in groupings such as the OECD and the EU, they had a much better chance of their concerns being heard. Those concerns were particularly acute in the wake of the events of 11 September. The effects on tourism, financial services, and insurance had been dire; Antigua suddenly lost 46% of its tourist bookings, while facing suddenly increased security costs. The US Patriot Act could result in the closure of many banks and financial institutions in the Caribbean. There was a need for the Commonwealth to pronounce in a meaningful way on the problems of small states and agree to a programme of measures at the international level which could promote their particular interests.

Adam Robertson said that in Australia's view there were two major priorities for the Coolum CHOGM. The first was, in an era of rapid change, to reaffirm the Commonwealth's enduring strengths and its relevance in the modern world. In an international environment where the number of specialized international organizations was proliferating and where funding for international activities remained tight, the Commonwealth faced increasing scrutiny of its value, purpose, and practical work. It was necessary to ensure that the Commonwealth measured up well against criticism and earned a respected place in international affairs in the twenty-first century. The second, related priority was to give the Commonwealth a sharper focus, to define its strengths and identify the areas where it could add real value and deploy its limited resources accordingly. This was essential if the Commonwealth was to retain its reputation as an effective body and partner in the wider international environment.

One of the Commonwealth's greatest strengths had been its ability and willingness to articulate core values and establish mechanisms to uphold them. Its commitment to core values set it apart in international relations. Another of its strengths was its role as a bridge-builder, and an avenue for dialogue between different states. In an age of increasing regionalism and global interdependence, this role was perhaps more important than ever. A third strength of the Commonwealth was the vigour of its non-governmental sector. The unofficial Commonwealth was a huge reservoir of expertise, and perhaps its greatest asset.

It was important that the Commonwealth's supporters should 'sell' its achievements - including in relation to decolonization, human rights, debt relief, and the particular problems of small, poor, or vulnerable states. Many of the Commonwealth's achievements were less well known than they deserved to be.

In the light of the two overriding priorities for the Commonwealth, it was possible to identify at least six key issues which the Commonwealth faced. The first was: how might the Commonwealth best advance its fundamental political values in the modern world? Arguably, the Commonwealth's major strength lay in its ability to promote good governance and institutional democracy - through the use of special envoys, the good offices role of the Secretariat, ministerial groups, CMAG, and other means. The role of CMAG remained central to this process, as the most important expression of the Commonwealth's commitment to core values, and also one of the Commonwealth's most distinctive assets. It was counterproductive to focus in an unduly mechanistic manner on the thresholds that triggered CMAG action: in Australia's view the heads of government, in setting up CMAG, envisaged a broader role and a wider remit.

Secondly, how could the impact of the Commonwealth's economic and development roles be maximized? Again it was important for the Commonwealth to form strategic partners with other international organizations, and focus on niche areas where it had demonstrable comparative advantage. One area of obvious strength derived from the Commonwealth's core values of encouraging the creation of a political environment that favoured economic development and good economic management. Another niche area was the Commonwealth's work in capacity building in small states. There was a strong case for re-assessing and streamlining some Commonwealth programmes to ensure the overall efficiency of the organization. The Commonwealth could benefit significantly from focusing its efforts in niche areas, and integrating its activities better with those of other development agencies, governments, and the private sector.

Thirdly, how could the Commonwealth build a constituency for the future? It had long been recognised that the interest and support of the next generation of Commonwealth citizens was critical for the health of the organization. If it was to survive and thrive in the twenty-first century, the Commonwealth had to develop ways of capturing the imagination and support of this group without embarking on costly or ineffective new programmes.

Fourthly, how could the official Commonwealth galvanize and build on the strength and vitality of its civil society? The non-official Commonwealth was a unique asset. While there was already an obvious synergy between the Commonwealth's NGOs and governments, this relationship could be built on. The experience of the postponed CHOGM perhaps demonstrated that there were better ways for this engagement to move forward than an unhealthy reliance on mass attendance at the CHOGM every two years. At the same time it was important to develop sounder and more consistent criteria for the accreditation of Commonwealth NGOs - which might include a commitment to shared values, transparency, and openness to all Commonwealth members.

Fifthly, were the Commonwealth's current structures the most appropriate for the twenty-first century? There was a need in any organization to revisit the effectiveness of existing structures and evaluate how change could reap benefits for all. The emphasis in the twenty-first century should be on resource-based management, evaluation of outputs against inputs, improved collaboration, decentralization, and the elimination of duplication of effort both internally and against external efforts elsewhere in the multilateral system.

Finally, how could the full potential of CHOGMs be realized? It was clear that the cost and resource intensiveness of CHOGMs was increasing, and was becoming increasingly unbearable for most Commonwealth countries. There was a need to take a critical look at current expectations of CHOGMs, and to ask whether in some areas more could be achieved by doing less. The arrangements for the Coolum CHOGM (with the meeting of the Committee of the Whole scheduled for London on 15 February, the focus at the CHOGM itself, from 2 to 5 March, being almost entirely on the meetings of heads of government) would perhaps provide a healthy precedent. There was, at the very least, a strong argument in favour of reducing the scope and therefore cost of CHOGMs, if the broadest possible number of Commonwealth members were to be encouraged to offer to host future CHOGMs.

• Several participants endorsed the speakers' observations on the growing cost of CHOGMs, and the benefits to be derived from a smaller and retreat-focussed CHOGM, as was planned for Coolum. Some felt that the retreats had themselves become more formalized and structured as they had become larger - though this in a sense was a good thing since it signalled a move from a situation which had sometimes held in the past, of a small group of heads of government taking many core decisions. Others believed that the opportunity for discussion in camera, without advisers, set speeches, and note-takers, remained the most valuable aspects of Commonwealth meetings. It was notable that ministers acting without their advisers in CMAG meetings frequently reached agreement much more swiftly than in meetings with them.
• The experience of some of those who had attended the Commonwealth People's Festival in Brisbane in October 2001 supported the view that Commonwealth NGOs might in the future benefit by holding a separate gathering elsewhere and at a different time from the CHOGM. Other participants disagreed, suggesting that the conjunction between the People's Festival and the meetings of official and heads, and the interaction between representatives of NGOs and of the 'official' Commonwealth, had been mutually beneficial, and should be encouraged. Any divorce between the meetings of the official and unofficial Commonwealths would diminish the attraction of the latter, particularly for young people. The experience of other international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was tending in the direction of more rather than less interaction between official meetings and related NGO activities..
• Many participants called - whatever the pattern for future NGO meetings - for a more creative and mutually enriching relationship between the official and unofficial Commonwealths. Both speakers agreed with the latter point. Commonwealth NGOs did perhaps more than governments to keep the Commonwealth together, and they represented immense reservoirs of dedication, time, effort, and expertise. It was to be hoped that the heads of government would develop some of the embryonic proposals put forward in the draft report of the High Level Review Group.
• There was considerable discussion of the future role of the Chair of the Commonwealth. Several participants believed that President Mbeki - though in large part for understandable reasons - had failed to make a success of the new position, and expressed the hope that Prime Minister Howard would make more of it. In defence of the role of the Chair in Office, Adam Robertson pointed out that the role had not yet been clearly defined. There were several specific references in the report of the High Level Review Group to the role of the Chair, and he thought it likely that the heads of government would move to clarify the role. Sir Ronald Sanders agreed that the results so far had been disappointing. The original proposal for a Chair had been put forward by representatives of the ACP countries, as a means of reinforcing the work of CMAG. He dismissed suggestions that there might be a potential clash between the role of the Secretary-General and the role of the Chair: the two were complementary, and the existence of the Chair should strengthen the Secretary-General's hand. The latter point was endorsed by a number of participants, several of whom suggested that as the choice of Chair was restricted by the small number of Commonwealth countries currently able to host CHOGMs, this was another reason for re-evaluating the future size of CHOGMs.
• A number of participants referred to Sir Ronald Sanders's remarks about small states. Some thought that there was a danger that the particular problems faced by small states would slip lower on the Commonwealth agenda: in the draft report of the High Level Review Group, one of the smallest sections was that on small states. Sir Ronald said that he personally was optimistic that a serious set of proposals would be put in front of the heads of government. There was now a Small States Advisory Group whose report would go to the Ministerial Group on Small States and from there to the heads. The Commonwealth Secretariat had not neglected the issue, and the current Secretary-General had done a great deal in this area in a short time.
• Two participants disagreed with Sir Ronald Sanders's remarks on the dispute between India and Pakistan. Commonwealth involvement (such as the good offices work of the Secretary-General) in bilateral disputes could indeed take place, but only with the consent of both parties: to inscribe bilateral issues on the agenda of CHOGMs without their consent would be the death of CHOGMs. Sir Ronald stood by his argument. In his view, what justified intervention in a member state should also justify intervention in bilateral disputes. The absence of machinery to deal with an issue was no reason for not establishing such machinery.
• Some participants took issue with Adam Robertson's injunction against costly new programmes. Why was it necessary to fight shy of new programmes? Capturing the imagination of young people was, arguably, the most important task before the Commonwealth. Experience had shown that funding could be found, if serious proposals could be put together, and shown to be relevant and cost-effective. Some participants felt that this was an area where the draft report of the High Level Review Group was wholly inadequate, and failed to reflect the feeling widespread amongst Commonwealth NGOs that the Commonwealth could be doing a lot more. Adam Robertson agreed that funding could be found if proposals were well put together, and were demonstrably good value for money; but he thought that funders would first need to be convinced that the Secretariat and related organizations were already moving funds to what they identified as priority areas, and were using those funds in the most cost-effective manner. Both he and other participants thought that particular opportunities could be found for attracting funding from other international agencies and from the private sector, and not just from member states.

Session III: The Commonwealth after 11 September 2001

Chair: Stephen Cox
Executive Secretary, The Royal Society; Chair-Designate, The Round Table

Speaker: HE Rt. Hon. Donald C. McKinnon
Commonwealth Secretary-General

View press notice issued by the Commonwealth Secretariat

HE Rt. Hon. Donald C. McKinnon said that many historians reckoned the twentieth century to have started not in 1900 but in 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War. He said that historians in the future could very well reckon the twenty-first century to have started not on 1 January 2000, but on 11 September 2001. The full financial, economic and human costs of the events of that day had yet to be counted, and indeed were still being added to; and it was too early to assess the full impact of those events. Nevertheless it was clear that 11 September marked a dramatic shift in international order; many changes had already taken place and many more would follow.

The events of 11 September had ushered in a new kind of war: not a war of territorial struggle but a war of shadows. No-one knew when, how, or where the terrorists would strike next. In the future, intelligence would count for more than military power. But it was important also to tackle the roots of terrorism. As John le Carré had said in 1989, the real enemies in the future would not be other human beings but poverty, illness, lack of education, environmental destruction, drugs, discrimination, and intolerance (including religious intolerance). The challenge for the world community was to rise to the challenge of managing globalization, diversity, and the break-up of traditional dividing-lines, in such a way as to remove the causes of violence and terrorism.

The Secretary-General believed that the Commonwealth had a clear role to play in the new international order which was emerging. First, it could help consolidate and strengthen the united front against terrorism. Secondly, it could, in concert with other international organizations, redouble its efforts to combat poverty, illness, and lack of education, in order to make life better for the less well-off. Thirdly, it could use its powerful experience of managing diversity in helping to promote tolerance and the furtherance of democratic values.

The threat of terrorism was not new to the Commonwealth. Many of its member states had been or still were affected by it, and some Commonwealth leaders had themselves been victims of terrorist attacks. It was natural therefore that many of its member states should feel the need to do something in the wake of the events of 11 September. On 25 October the heads of government issued a far-reaching statement on terrorism, which declared that any member country found to be supporting terrorism would be deemed to be in violation of Commonwealth principles. The statement further authorized the establishment of a Commonwealth ministerial committee to consider what actions could be taken in order to combat the threat of terrorism. Its first meeting would take place in late January 2002, and it was hoped that important steps would be taken in such areas as helping to cut off the money supply to terrorists, exploring the common legal framework to facilitate new laws to expedite extradition, and otherwise assisting member states to co-operate with the international community in the implementation of UN resolution 1373.

The economic fallout from the events of 11 September had hit the poorest countries hardest, and had made an immediate impact on trade, banking, and tourism. The already severe economic problems faced by those countries on 10 September had been compounded by the events of the following day. A recent World Bank report had shown that the effects of any global slowdown would hit the poorest countries hardest. Tens of millions of people would be thrown into poverty as a direct result of the events of 11 September, and tens of thousands of children would die.

Even before 11 September 2001, some 1.2 billion of the world's inhabitants were living on less than US$1 a day. The world had experienced unprecedented economic growth over the previous ten years; yet few of its benefits had trickled down to its poorest inhabitants. It had been estimated that 10% of the world's population owned more than 50% of its wealth, while another 10% owned less than ½%; and the figures were moving in the wrong direction. It was important to reject the fatalistic view that poverty was unavoidable, and it was incumbent on the international community to do all it could to tackle the problem of poverty. An attitude of selfishness and indifference on the part of the richer nations would only make the whole world poorer. Developed countries should re-assess their aid commitments, and at least match existing UN targets. But aid was only one way to tackle the problem of poverty, and it was insufficient by itself. It was also necessary to help the poorer countries take control of their own affairs, and to trade and develop their way out of poverty. The pressure for action on debt (which had already made significant progress) needed to be maintained. Trade barriers needed to be reduced. Action needed to be taken to tackle the problem of poor health: good health was a prerequisite for growth as well as a consequence. Education was crucial: fanaticism preyed on ignorance. What was need was an integrated approach, in the development of which the Commonwealth could help play its part.

It had often been said that the events of 11 September had exposed the darker side of globalization: the development of global networks of terrorism, using the latest technology to further their aims, and exploiting the strains produced by globalization to mobilize support for their activities. But globalization was an inevitable process - as Archbishop Tutu had said, we are all interconnected, whether we like it or not. The challenge for the international community was to ensure that the process of globalization was managed in such away as to reduce rather than increase the gap between the rich and poor - to ensure that it worked for the benefit of all rather than of a few. In fact, the poorer states needed more rather than less globalization, and it was important that the richer states should respond by levelling the playing field.

The strength of the Commonwealth lay in the solidarity of its member states and their common commitment to democratic values and the rule of law; and in its inclusiveness and the diversity of its membership. The Commonwealth included states large and small, rich and poor. When they came together in a united front, they could be a powerful force for good. The Commonwealth, both official and unofficial, had in the past played an important role in helping to promote and strengthen democratic values in its member states. It was important to continue that work. Even in well-established democracies there was room for improvement - for the deepening of democracy, to ensure that it worked better and continued to mean something. Democracy was in every society a safety valve, a bulwark against discrimination and alienation, and a promoter of a sense of shared values and public good. It was of the essence of democracy that disagreements could be resolved peacefully, without resort to violence. Democratic values were the antithesis of those espoused by terrorists; only through the extension of those values, including a culture of tolerance and respect for the rule of law, could the terrorist threat be countered.

The end of the Cold War ten years previously had induced a certain complacency in some quarters of the developed world. Francis Fukuyama had famously heralded 'the end of history'. But it was clear that the triumph of liberal democratic values could not be taken for granted. Indeed, the enormous progress in science and technology seen in the twentieth century had seemingly not been matched by any similar progress in political morality. The twentieth century had been one of the bloodiest in human history, and there was not a year in it when there was not, somewhere in the world, a war going on. The challenge for the twenty-first century was to close the gap between science and morality. A politics of responsibility was needed in place of a politics of indifference. Martin Luther King's great dream, of a world without prejudice or hatred, was still very much alive, and very much needed. The essential message - of reconciliation, inclusiveness, and solidarity - was one which the Commonwealth should relentlessly pursue, its member states and non-governmental organizations working together to promote the common good.

• The Secretary-General was asked whether he expected the ministerial group on terrorism to last beyond the forthcoming (March 2002) CHOGM. He was also asked whether the coming into existence of the group, and the growing importance of CMAG, reflected a belated move towards a better use of foreign ministers within the Commonwealth. He responded on the first point by saying that the issue of terrorism was likely to remain high on the international community's agenda for some time. He expected the CHOGM to give guidance to the ministerial group, which he expected to continue beyond the CHOGM, and which he thought could do valuable work, in conjunction with the committee on terrorism of the UN Security Council and other bodies. On the second point, it had been the case that foreign ministers had little personally to do with Commonwealth affairs, unless their country happened to be hosting a CHOGM. But it would not be true to say that foreign ministries had little to do with Commonwealth matters, since they were often intimately involved in providing briefings for CHOGMs, meetings of law or education ministers, etc. The increasing involvement of foreign ministers themselves was very much to be encouraged. For one thing, if they developed a better understanding of the Commonwealth dimension, they would be more inclined to make sure that their officials did likewise.
• It was argued that what made the current terrorist threat so dangerous (and qualitatively different from previous terrorist threats) was that it surmised and preyed on a religious but also cultural divide between the developed West and the rest of the world. Was there anything that the Commonwealth in particular could be doing to reduce the dangers of religious and cultural polarization? The Secretary-General thought that this was indeed a challenge for the Commonwealth. Its very diversity was here its greatest strength. There were fanatics and extremists in every religion. It was necessary to isolate fanaticism and extremism, and make them seen as such. He suggested that there might be scope for a common declaration by leaders of the different religions within the Commonwealth, affirming their common horror of terrorism and their common commitment to tolerance and peaceful co-existence.
• One participant suggested that at times in the previous few months it had seemed that Osama bin Laden had been winning the propaganda war against his enemies, largely by portraying his struggle as one against the evil forces of globalization and Western influence. It was of course something of a conjuring trick for bin Laden to associate his struggle with that of those marginalized by globalization. Nevertheless, was there anything that the Commonwealth and its member states could be doing to counter this image? The Secretary-General agreed that it was a conjuring trick, and he did not believe that the trick could be sustained for long. There was clear evidence of the benefits of globalization around the world, including in many developing countries - whether it be the use of the internet in small island states to improve health and education, or the immediate benefits of mobile phone technology in countries without extensive cable networks. If the public debate on globalization had been lost, it was likely to be only temporarily.
• It was suggested that a sense of perspective needed to be kept on the scale of the terrorist threat. The loss of some 6000 lives on 11 September was a tragedy, but a similar number of lives were being lost every day in the developing world through HIV and AIDS. The international community had mobilized an estimated $4 billion in its military fight against terrorism. Was it not possible to develop at least the same sense of solidarity in the face of HIV and AIDS? The Secretary-General said that it was a political fact of life that a single event like the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon should have more impact than an event which took place with relentless regularity day after day. Nevertheless he very much sympathized with the point of view of the questioner. The key to combatting the spread of HIV and AIDS was surely education. A very significant change in recent years had been the decline in the incidence of AIDS in many developed countries - a decline which could be attributed almost entirely to better education. Clearly an enormous amount of work had to be done. The role that the Commonwealth itself could play was necessarily limited, because of its limited resources. Nevertheless there were some important Commonwealth programmes, and the Commonwealth could help in other ways to support the work of UNESCO, the WHO, etc.
• The Secretary-General was asked whether he thought there was any realistic prospect of an increase in resources for Commonwealth bodies as a result of the Coolum CHOGM. The CFTC's budget had been reduced by some 40% in real terms over the 1990s, and funding for the Commonwealth Secretariat was stagnant. Without increased resources, was not talk of new roles for the Commonwealth unrealistic? The Secretary-General agreed that the Commonwealth was limited in what it could do by the resources at its disposal. The scope for increased resources was small, since most countries liked to put their own labels on their own projects. Nevertheless he did believe that if the case for a substantial increase in resources for activities of a project-related nature could be put, it would be received quite positively by Commonwealth member states. He also thought it worthwhile to explore other sources of funding for specific projects.
• Questioned as to whether he thought that the Commonwealth was right, in the face of problems such as HIV/AIDS, to take the approach, 'we should do our bit', or whether it was better to say, 'these are our distinctive approaches', the Secretary-General said that the latter approach was undoubtedly the better. It was necessary constantly to review the Commonwealth's work, to refocus its activities, and to prioritize in those areas where the Commonwealth had distinct advantages, and added value. Nevertheless there would always be an element of the former approach, since there was an inevitable political imperative to ensure that the Commonwealth supported projects which benefited each and all of its members.
• Asked whether he saw a significant role for the Commonwealth in relation to the next round of trade negotiations under the WTO, the Secretary-General said that the forthcoming round was likely to penetrate more deeply into every economy than any previous round. It was important that all those affected should contribute to the process. The Commonwealth could play an important role in supporting member states, particularly small states, in the negotiations: helping them wherever possible to influence the negotiations, but also to evaluate the effects of proposals and to adjust their own policies accordingly.
• The Secretary-General was asked whether he thought the divorce between the official CHOGM and Commonwealth NGO activities enforced by the postponement of the Brisbane CHOGM and its reincarnation in Coolum (with a prior meeting of the Committee of the Whole in London in February) might in fact be a pointer to the future. The increasing size and cost of CHOGMs had raised serious doubts about the ability of come countries to host the meetings; while the experience at Brisbane in October 2001 had shown that there were perhaps some advantages for the unofficial Commonwealth in their own meetings not being overshadowed by the meetings of the heads of government. The Secretary-General agreed that a key benefit of the re-scheduled CHOGM would be the greater amount of time allocated to the heads' retreat, without their officials. The heads usually enjoyed their retreats: without their officials they could say what they really thought, they could listen more, and they frequently reached understandings and made progress that would have been difficult in more formal settings. Nevertheless he would not like to say that he advocated a permanent divorce between CHOGMs and the NGOs' people's festivals. The role of civil society organizations in the Commonwealth was much valued, and it was important to bring the official and unofficial Commonwealths together.

Session IV: The Commonwealth and globalization

Chair:
Hon. Sir Humphrey Maud
Former Deputy Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat

Speakers:
Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy
Acting Director, Economic Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat
Dr. Mohan Kaul
Director-General, Commonwealth Business Council

Sir Humphrey Maud introduced the session by saying that the word 'globalization' was a much used and much misused word. He himself understood the term in the sense adumbrated by the Commonwealth Secretary-General in evidence before the UK Parliamentary Select Committee on the Global Economy - the process of international integration which had been accelerated by revolutions in trade policy, the free movement of international capital, and information technology. In this sense, globalization represented for many a threat as well as an opportunity. To date, the benefits of the process had been distributed extremely unevenly, generating a risk of marginalization and polarization both within and between societies. The challenge, as Amartya Sen had written, was to ensure a fairer distribution of the fruits of globalization. The Commonwealth had addressed this problem in the Edinburgh Economic Declaration in 1997. Then it had highlighted the huge opportunities but also the uneven benefits of globalization, and had called for better management of the process. Nevertheless it committed itself firmly to the view that the world's poorer countries would benefit from more, rather than less, globalization. Since the Edinburgh CHOGM, 'globalization' had become the target for a diverse coalition of protesters, who had (in his own view wrongly) identified the Bretton Woods institutions, the OECD, and the international trading system, including the WTO, with the purely negative aspects of globalization; and they had even threatened to disrupt the CHOGM that was to be held at Brisbane in October 2001. How were their arguments to be countered? How was the moral challenge posed by Amartya Sen to be met? And what were the specific areas in which the Commonwealth could help those at risk of marginalization to benefit from the fruits of globalization?

Indrajit Coomaraswamy said that globalization was not a new phenomenon. Cultural interaction and global economic integration were processes which had been going on for centuries. For the last part of the second millennium, the direction of cultural traffic had been largely one-way, from Europe (or the West) to the rest; but at the start of that millennium it had flowed the other way - from the Arabs and Chinese. Arguably, the world was (politically and culturally) more 'globalized' at the start of the twentieth century than at its end. But what marked out 'globalization' as it was now commonly understood - and as applied only to the last few decades of the twentieth century - was a qualitative difference in the pace and depth of economic, social, political, and cultural interaction and change, driven by revolutions in the capital markets, trade, and information technology.

Globalization inevitably generated uncertainty and dislocation. There had been winners and losers. Many groups and individuals felt threatened. Many questioned the merits of the process. The events of 11 September 2001 had intensified the global recession already underway, and would undoubtedly have a more wide-ranging, long-term impact. But there were no grounds for assuming that the process of globalization was likely to be derailed; nor that the economic policies it necessitated were likely to change. Similarly, while 'anti-globalization' protests such as those seen in Seattle, Prague, Gothenburg and Genoa might in the short term seem distasteful or unpatriotic, the abating of protest - and of wider disquiet - was bound to be short-lived unless the legitimate and genuine concerns which globalization generated were addressed.

First among those concerns was the effect that globalization had so far had in intensifying disparities both within and between nations. During the last quarter of the twentieth century the world had become incomparably richer, but at the same time staggeringly unequal. A large swathe of humanity was now threatened with marginalization. Within developed countries, many observers had identified the emergence of a marginalized underclass. In the developing world, whole countries were threatened with marginalization. Multilateral trade liberalization had resulted in asymmetric benefits, especially as agriculture and textiles were still heavily protected in developed countries. Developing countries had in many cases undergone painful adjustments in liberalizing trade, only to find that tariff cuts had not gained reciprocal benefits. Capital flows were still overwhelmingly concentrated within the developed world, while capital flows to emerging markets were overwhelmingly concentrated in a handful of countries. The challenge was to ensure that globalization benefited all.

A second area of concern was the role of multinational companies. These now accounted for over two-thirds of international trade, and they were the key drivers of globalization. There were legitimate concerns about their behaviour and accountability, and there was a strong need for a more ethical business culture. There was also a need to enable small- and medium-sized businesses (which accounted for a large part of the economies in the developing world) to take advantage of the opportunities provided by globalization. For this there was a strong need for more training, transfer of technology, and capacity building.

A third concern was the effect of globalization on national sovereignty. There were no accountable and inclusive arrangements for global economic governance. Current arrangements and institutions largely reflected the status quo of 1945, and were dominated by developed countries which appeared largely inattentive to the needs of developing countries. There was a need for more inclusive and more widely accountable global structures to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The meeting of the WTO in Seattle had been a watershed, in that developing countries had not allowed themselves to be bounced into unreciprocated concessions. There were other signs of a change in the international climate.

A fourth area of concern was the threat of the homogenization of culture which appeared to go hand in hand with globalization. This raised almost primordial fears in some quarters, and was clearly a contributory factor towards the fundamentalism that had inspired the terrorist attacks of 11 September - though other factors were clearly involved, such as Israeli and US policy in the Middle East and a lack of political reform in the region. There was a need to address the cultural issues raised by globalization, and to promote tolerance and cultural diversity as key elements in global political culture.

The Commonwealth was acting at various levels to help manage the impact of globalization. It had played a particularly significant role in promoting fundamental political values and the creation of an enabling economic environment, in analytical and consensus-building work in the WTO and other international organizations, in helping member states to develop their trade policies and negotiating capacity, in promoting the HIPC initiative and the Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative, and in highlighting the needs of small states. Its work with small states was especially important. Many small states had adopted sound economic policies but were not getting the right investment response; and their problems of size and remoteness would in many cases not be overcome by purely economic processes. There was a need to promote public-private partnerships to reduce the costs and risks of investment. More generally, the key to economic progress in developing countries was more investment. Without more investment and the development of competitive capacity such countries would continue to be threatened with marginalization.

For many developing countries, recent decades had witnessed an erosion of trade preferences, painful economic adjustment, and a decline in overseas development aid. The prognosis was not good, unless the world community rose to the challenge. As Amartya Sen had also said, the predicament of the world's poor could not be reversed by withholding participation in the process of globalization. The challenge for the twenty-first century was to manage the process better, and to replicate at a global level the evolution of social democracy that had at a national level been one of the most positive developments in the twentieth century.

Mohan Kaul said that the events of 11 September 2001 were a significant watershed, whose repercussions would be felt for a long time yet. The challenges for international business had been mounting both before and since those terrible events and the resulting international tension, as a result of three issues: the scale and impact of the terrorist attacks themselves; economic recession in America, Europe and Asia; and the backlash against globalization by activists and campaigning NGOs in particular. Put together, these issues had created an increasingly hostile environment for international business, with increased sense of risk, and vulnerability to political and community forces. As a result, companies had had to take practical measures at the operational level and consider deeper engagement with the wider community to strengthen the defences and response to terror and conflict. On the positive side, there was now perhaps an increased awareness of the mutual dependency of business, governments and public services, and the need for consent and support from communities in which companies operated.

The challenges of globalization had long been recognised by Commonwealth governments. At Edinburgh in 1997, the heads of government had described globalization as a double-edged sword: while it could help fuel the engines of growth, it had not so far delivered benefits equitably, and many countries were threatened with marginalization. 'Globalization', they declared, 'therefore needs to be carefully managed to meet the risks inherent in the process'. Business in the Commonwealth had also become increasingly aware of its role in helping to make globalization work in a way which combined economic advance with social development. As Niall Fitzgerald, Chairman of Unilever, had said at the Commonwealth Business Forum in London in September 2000, 'Business really can help to tackle wider social, economic and environmental challenges, not least by providing professional, technical and scientific expertise. Governments, business and non-governmental organizations all need to work together to tap into that expertise if we are to spread the benefits of globalization as widely as possible'.

The Commonwealth was well placed to meet those challenges, drawing on the collective experience of its members. Over the last ten years the Commonwealth had come of age and had proved, by drawing on its shared values, that it could make a difference in achieving change. Through its focus on democratization and the principles articulated in the 1991 Harare declaration, the Commonwealth had been able to exert tremendous pressure on governments to adhere to common standards, particularly through the CMAG initiative. The link between democratic principles and economic advance had also been strongly demonstrated, most recently in the case of Zimbabwe.

Since the Edinburgh declaration, the Commonwealth had made efforts to help expand international trade and investment. Notable achievements at the intergovernmental level included progress on reducing the burden of debt through Commonwealth leadership on the HIPC initiative; the Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative and its regional funds for investment in developing countries; the Trade and Investment Access Facility to assist developing countries with the process of adjusting to, and taking advantage of, the opportunities of globalization; and special attention to the needs of small states, for example on issues of tax competition and approaches to overcoming their vulnerability.

One of the most significant outcomes of the Edinburgh CHOGM - as many heads of government had acknowledged - had been the formation of the Commonwealth Business Council, to help remove barriers to trade, promote investment, create a good environment for business, facilitate the expansion of e-commerce, and foster dialogue between governments and the private sector on key issues relating to trade and investment. Amongst the CBC's priorities in the previous few months had been the development of a 16-point Action Programme designed to strengthen partnership between business and governments in order to encourage investment in the Commonwealth; and the establishment of a Friends of Africa Business Group to look at ways of mobilizing support for the New Partnerships for Africa's Development initiative being led by the Presidents of South Africa and Nigeria. The CBC's programme of investment conferences had continued to facilitate discussion and deals for investment into Commonwealth developing countries, while the CBC had also initiated a programme of activities to support the wider adoption of principles and strategies for good corporate citizenship across the Commonwealth.

The potential for the Commonwealth to provide leadership in guiding globalization in a positive direction was significant. Thirty years previously, most Commonwealth economies were centrally planned, but now they were all market economies; this was a critical transformation, and the role of the Commonwealth in this process merited examination. Thirteen of the world's fastest growing economies were in the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth's understanding of the circumstances and needs of emerging markets was an important asset. Aside from the United States, the leading countries in the development of information technology and e-commerce were Commonwealth countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, India, Malaysia, Singapore. Over 100 Indian software companies were now represented in the UK. This reflected a continuing pattern of intra-Commonwealth trade and investment. The UK was the largest or second largest investor in Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Africa, and many other Commonwealth countries, while developing countries were now contributing significant investment flows in the other direction. India now ranked eighth among foreign investors in the UK.

Sadly, the modern reality of the Commonwealth was not being successfully projected, particularly in Britain and the 'old' Commonwealth, where many people still associated the Commonwealth with the colonial past. In contrast, in many developing countries, particularly with the younger generation, the first thought was for the opportunities, including business and commerce, that Commonwealth relationships could offer. The Commonwealth needed to be projected in a modern way by political leaders and others.

Despite some measures of progress and achievement in the four and a half years since the Edinburgh CHOGM, the promise of Edinburgh had yet to be fully realized. The necessary attention, including political will and resources, had not been devoted to working towards promoting the shared prosperity which should so rightly belong to all countries. When so many Commonwealth countries were still struggling to meet basic needs for health and education, and while the scourges of HIV/AIDS and illiteracy persisted, it was not possible to rest in the belief that goals had been adequately achieved. Perhaps the time had come for a CMAG-type mechanism (such as a joint ministerial group of finance ministers and trade ministers) by which the economic and developmental principles adopted at Edinburgh and reiterated at Durban could be reviewed and promoted. This could help the Commonwealth to make a meaningful contribution to helping raise standards of development to an acceptable level.

• A number of participants applauded the movement from general discussion of globalization (what it meant, and whether we should have it or not) to the specific development issues thrown up by globalization. Globalization was inevitable; it was driven by impersonal forces; and it was not possible even to talk of 'controlling' the process. The focus of discussion had to be on managing its impact, and on the specific ways in which marginalization could be overcome.
• Several participants agreed with the speakers in highlighting the importance of education. That English was the lingua franca of global trade was a significant advantage for Commonwealth countries. Yet levels of illiteracy and poor education were still alarmingly high, while low levels of technical education were a major barrier to economic growth. It was thought that these were areas in which the Commonwealth could be doing a lot more.
• A number of participants reinforced Indrajit Coomaraswamy's point about the time-lag in the response of foreign investment to a change in economic policies in developing countries. Countries such as Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania had undergone painful periods of adjustment, but were not being rewarded by the inflows of investment which they were led to expect. The difficulties that had been experienced in attracting funds for the Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative showed that this problem was deep-rooted.
• It was thought by a number of speakers that what was needed was a more 'global' mindset, which would promote a fundamental shift in the architecture of international relations, and a rapid acceleration of capacity-building and development aid.
• Some doubts were expressed about the feasibility of a CMAG-type mechanism for ensuring compliance with economic and development standards, as suggested by Mohan Kaul. The Harare and Millbrook declarations had included important sections on the economy, education, the environment, and sustainable development; but these had never been translated into actionable standards, and it was difficult to see how they could be. Against what standards would countries be judged? And what sanctions could be imposed against them? Mohan Kaul responded by saying that it would not be difficult to set country-specific targets for such things as the size of education budgets. He agreed that it might hardly be appropriate to impose 'sanctions'; but there were nevertheless great benefits to be derived from addressing these issues, and monitoring compliance with shared economic principles.
• Several participants picked up on the speakers' remarks about NGOs and the 'anti-globalization' movement. It was felt that the latter consisted of a fragile coalition of diverse causes and interest groups; nevertheless that many issue-focused campaigns (such as the 'blood diamonds' campaign) had had a very significant beneficial impact. The role of the NGO sector in development and capacity-building was important, and there was felt to be a need to draw the NGO sector more closely into global decision-making processes. Both speakers responded positively to these points.
• It was pointed out that neither speaker had mentioned the problem of environmental degradation. There seemed to be an assumption that the key to managing globalization more successfully was simply redistribution and the reduction of disparities. Yet at the heart of the debate on globalization was the environmental question - and the need for sustainable development. Environmental degradation went hand in hand with lack of protection for the rights of indigenous peoples, and the poor record of some Commonwealth countries in relation to the latter undermined its claim to be a paragon of diversity. Indrajit Coomaraswamy responded by agreeing that both points were very important. He was hopeful of a new Commonwealth expert group bringing together economists, environmentalists and human rights campaigners, to examine ways in which globalization could be made a productive force for sustainable development.

Session V: The Commonwealth's distinctive roles

Chair:
Richard Bourne
Head, Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit, Institute of Commonwealth Studies

Speakers:
Hass Dellal
Director, Australian Multicultural Foundation
Sandra Pepera
Senior Governance Adviser, International Division, Department for International Development

Richard Bourne opened the session by saying that there was a real need for hard and clear thinking about the Commonwealth. It was easy to be self-congratulatory about the Commonwealth amongst true believers. But the reality was that the Commonwealth had, whatever its successes or potential, a very low profile, and was frequently subject to misinterpretation or ignorance. There had been hopes that the High Level Review Group would lead to a major step forward. From the leaked contents of its report this now seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, a similar exercise in 1991 had been completely overtaken by the Harare declaration, and it was again possible that the Coolum CHOGM would result in something far more ambitious. Certainly, various NGOs had been active in helping to prepare the ground for such a move, with an 'alternative' report forthcoming from a broad platform of Commonwealth NGOs, and many briefing papers being circulated prior to CHOGM. How could the Commonwealth project itself better in the twenty-first century, what were its distinctive roles, and how might it best take advantage of its strengths in facing the challenges ahead?

Hass Dellal said that helping to manage cultural diversity was one way in which the Commonwealth could turn its potential into positive advantage. The issue of managing cultural diversity had risen up the international agenda since the end of the Cold War, with the resurgence of ethnic and cultural intolerance, the increase in religious fundamentalism, and the identification of globalization with cultural homogenization. The problem of managing diversity affected nearly all areas of the world: 90% of countries were linguistically, religiously, or culturally mixed. Political and cultural boundaries rarely coincided. The potential for discrimination, insurgency, conflict, and territorial separatism was great, and the world showed many different models for coping with diversity.

The reality was that diversity would continue, and increase. Separatism, segregation, and assimilation were not acceptable solutions; tolerance and inclusivity were. Access, equity, and accountability were crucial if multicultural societies were not to tear themselves apart. Cultural diversity should not be an afterthought in planning: the needs of all people should be the basis of planning, which should start with dialogue with all concerned. Education was crucial in promoting cultures of tolerance and acceptance of diversity. Many discriminatory perceptions were formed young, and education was the best antidote to stereotyping and discrimination. At the same time, young people were attracted by the positive benefits of diversity, and it was important to give them a vision of the benefits of inclusivity.

The Commonwealth, with its 1.7 billion citizens, had plenty of experience of dealing with the problem of managing cultural diversity. Virtually every one of its 54 countries had a rich multicultural heritage. Its experience had not all been positive, but it had some of the best examples of successfully managing diversity. It was important to celebrate some of those achievements and to put them forward as models and benchmarks of good practice. Australian experience suggested that there were four key principles in successfully managing a culturally diverse society. First, social inclusion: the acceptance by all of common norms and values, and of basic structures. Secondly, cultural respect: the acceptance by all of the right of each to express his or her own cultural or religious heritage. Thirdly, social equity: the removal of all barriers of discrimination, and equal access to all opportunities. Fourthly, productive diversity: the recognition that diversity could be turned to advantage, and that the skills and talents of every member of society should be utilized. The latter point was crucial. There were significant advantages to be derived from harnessing the skills, knowledge, contacts and networks of culturally diverse communities; Australia, for instance, was now home to the headquarters of many multinational companies, which appreciated the competitive advantages of a culturally rich environment.

The diversity and vibrancy of the modern Commonwealth were among its greatest strengths. There was a powerful case for the Commonwealth to take a lead in championing cultural diversity and promoting best practice. The belief that the Commonwealth could make a significant difference in this area was what led to the 'Diversity Matters' Forum, co-sponsored by the Commonwealth Institute and the Australian Multicultural Foundation, in Brisbane on 3-5 October 2001. This forum resulted in a set of recommendations to heads of government, which it was hoped would be followed up at Coolum. These recommendation included that the Commonwealth should: issue a basic statement of principles of what constitutes a community which values its cultural diversity; establish inter-faith councils in Commonwealth countries to promote respect for diversity, human rights, and individual freedoms; establish, develop and promulgate innovative models of leadership appropriate to culturally diverse Commonwealth countries; explore, in association with other agencies such as the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, possible new mechanisms for the promotion of human rights; develop a consistent framework for the identification and evaluation of public and educational policies and practice which promote the value of cultural diversity; develop ways of engendering greater understanding and valuing of diversity in business; and explore ways to encourage a free media which would accurately reflect the culturally diverse composition of all member states of the Commonwealth.

There was a natural tendency in humankind to emphasize difference rather than sameness. The acceptance of diversity within a shared framework of tolerance and basic human values was one of the greatest challenges ahead. The challenge demanded clear thinking, political leadership, and public support. The Commonwealth, with its rich multicultural background and its vast experience of managing diversity, was the natural forum for tackling these issues. Cultural diversity needed to be a prominent and permanent item on the Commonwealth agenda.

Sandra Pepera addressed the Commonwealth's distinctive roles from a development perspective. She prefaced her remarks by saying that the international context was one in which there was a very serious development deficit. There were growing inequalities within and between countries, and the scale of poverty, ill-health and lack of education was the greatest challenge to the international community. In face of the enormity of these problems, the Commonwealth could never be a big player. It could not, nor should it, hope to compete with the UNDP, or the Bretton Woods Institutions. Rather, it should focus on its niche strengths.

Not everything done under Commonwealth auspices had always been value-added. As the appointment of the High Level Review Group had recognised, there was a continuing need to rethink Commonwealth activities, and to focus effort in areas where the Commonwealth could bring particular strengths and advantages. One of those strengths derived from the very smallness of its official institutions: small enough to be responsive (though not merely reactive) in a way which sometimes eluded larger bodies. One way in which the Commonwealth could contribute to development was by picking up and running with new ideas: launching initiatives and small pilot projects, evaluating them, and quickly disseminating best practice. Simultaneously, the Commonwealth also derived strength from the size and diversity of its membership. It was large enough to include countries from every continent and at every stage of development. Debates within the association had the capacity to inform members' participation in other fora.

There were really two Commonwealths: the official Commonwealth and the NGO Commonwealth. The unofficial Commonwealth was an enormous fund of experience and expertise. Nevertheless it was important for Commonwealth NGOs also to take a careful look at what they were doing, and to evaluate and re-focus their activities. In general, it would be healthy for Commonwealth NGOs to move away from their sometimes cosy associational roles in favour of advocacy, capacity building, and engaging in national and international policy debates around development issues. The non-governmental sector had a lot to add to the Commonwealth's engagement in the development debate.

Sandra Pepera identified five particular challenges ahead of the Commonwealth, where it could seek to exploit its niche strengths to promote development. The first was to strengthen and deepen its commitment to shared principles: not only its political values, but the economic values which had been outlined in the Harare, Millbrook, Edinburgh and Durban declarations. There was a need to return to the totality and interconnectedness of these principles, in order to take forward a strong Commonwealth message that development needed to be both sustainable and equitable.

The second challenge for the Commonwealth was to build on and develop its work of advocacy in relation to other international organizations. There was a need to develop the capacity within the Commonwealth Secretariat to engage more closely with other international organizations, and to develop partnerships with them. The third challenge was to take a critical look at the quality and sustainability of existing Commonwealth development assistance programmes, in order to re-focus in areas where it had demonstrable niche strengths. One such area lay in high-level capacity building. Another lay in the Commonwealth's work with and on behalf of small states, which was now a crucial dimension of its activities.

The fourth challenge was private sector development - not opening up markets for the multinationals or assisting the privatization of utilities, but promoting the development of and enabling small- and medium-sized businesses, including sole traders, who accounted for a large part of economic activity in developing countries.

The fifth and final challenge was to set out agendas for discussion in areas where the Commonwealth had particular expertise or experience, such as cultural diversity, diasporas, or small-sates. The Commonwealth could act as both a think tank and a ginger group for new approaches to development and new paths to prosperity. This was perhaps the most important role that, with its limited resources, it could perform.

• There was considerable discussion of the current and potential Commonwealth role in providing technical assistance, particularly in the field of information technology, which was thought to be amongst the most fruitful areas of Commonwealth activity. It was clear that there were both risks and opportunities in introducing new technologies, and the application of them had been uneven; it was felt by many that the Commonwealth could be doing a lot more in this field.
• It was suggested that another area where the Commonwealth could be providing technical assistance of a high level was in developing contract law. Enforceable contract law was an essential pre-requisite for sustained inward investment and wealth creation. Drawing on common frameworks and practices, the Commonwealth could be doing more to help member states develop legal systems which encouraged wealth creation.
• In view of the close interconnection between economic and social decline and situations of political repression and conflict, the speakers were asked whether they thought that the Commonwealth might have anything to offer in situations of economic decline. They responded by saying that they took it as assumed that the Commonwealth should continue its work in conflict situations, and applauded the fact that the Secretariat had already moved a long way towards a conflict prevention agenda. Nevertheless they agreed that it was difficult to envisage the mechanisms or resources to deal with situations of economic breakdown.
• There was some discussion of the use of the term 'niche' to describe the Commonwealth's role or roles. In the opinion of one participant, the Commonwealth should be a main player, not a niche player: to accept a 'niche' position would be to condemn the Commonwealth to a limited role and lack of original thinking. Sandra Pepera defended her use of the term. The Commonwealth could not attempt to be another UN; it had to be selective about what it could attempt to do. It should identify those areas in which it had comparative advantages, and where there was no duplication of the work of other international bodies. The Commonwealth could continue to act on a big stage, but could make a more significant impact by focusing its contribution.
• While many participants agreed with Sandra Pepera's point that the Commonwealth should be focusing more on those areas in which it had demonstrable advantages, it was suggested that the real test came at the implementation stage. There would then always be special pleading and 'mandate spread'. How could Commonwealth bodies grapple with the implementational challenge? Sandra Pepera responded by saying that the Secretariat and other bodies would have to become more ruthless. The Commonwealth could not hope to satisfy all the demands made on it, and there were clear advantages in concentrating on those core functions which no other international body was carrying out, or could carry out as well.
• A number of participants picked up on the suggestion of interfaith councils. Some supported the idea wholeheartedly, while others suggested that it was important also to represent adherents of secular moral value systems. The interfaith model of Commonwealth Day observances was commended, with the six affirmations at the heart of the observance open to all faiths and none.
• Hass Dellal's call for a Commonwealth lead on the issue of cultural diversity found much support. It was thought that this was an area in which Commonwealth countries had much experience both good and bad, and where there was a need to adopt guiding principles and disseminate best practice.
• There was further discussion of the roles of Commonwealth NGOs and their relationship with the official Commonwealth. A number of participants agreed with Sandra Pepera's point that the NGOs needed continuously to review their own activities, but it was thought wrong to imply that this was not already largely the case. It was again suggested that the Commonwealth NGOs might benefit from de-coupling their biannual People's Festival from the CHOGM. In the past, the People's Festival had come very much under the shadow of the CHOGM; at Brisbane in 2001 it had come under the shadow of CHOGM's postponement. The People's Festival should be able to stand on its own. Moreover, the profile of the Commonwealth tended to sag in the year without a CHOGM. Holding the NGO festival in the alternate, non-CHOGM year (perhaps in the country which would host the next CHOGM) would help raise the profile of the Commonwealth, enable NGOs to raise their own profiles, and focus minds and new thinking in advance of the CHOGM the following year. This proposal found widespread support.
• The emphasis of both speakers, and indeed of previous speakers at the meeting, on the importance of the Commonwealth re-focusing and developing its activities in those areas where it had demonstrable advantages, was applauded. It was pointed out that a number of themes or areas of comparative advantage had emerged - including cultural diversity, education, technical assistance, and capacity-building - and it was hoped that the heads of government would take forward some of these priorities at Coolum.

Session VI: Retrospect and prospect

Speaker: Dr. Peter Lyon
Editor, The Round Table

Peter Lyon said that what had been intended as a post-Brisbane meeting had become a pre-Coolum one. Inevitably discussion of the Commonwealth had been more speculative. But this had been no bad thing. A number of speakers had grasped the opportunity to raise pertinent questions about the Commonwealth and its probable immediate future, and to give tentative answers.

What had been the significance of the events of 11 September 2001? How well had the Commonwealth responded to them? And what role or roles could the Commonwealth play in the new international environment? Many speakers had made clear that the events of 11 September 2001 represented a watershed, crystallizing if not opening up a new era in international relations, dominated by the pax Americana on the one hand, and by a new world disorder on the other. The world now lived in the shadow of terrorism. The demons of 'globalization' had been let loose - and those of anti-globalization.

Many participants in the meeting had questioned the postponement of CHOGM. The Commonwealth was in no sense now (if it ever had been) a security organization - Emeka Anyaoku had sometimes been lobbed questions on that topic. It was unlikely that Don McKinnon would be, but it was nevertheless clear from the meeting that the Commonwealth had a lot to say about terrorism, and perhaps also a lot to contribute to the global consensus and international action against it. The Commonwealth's subsequent, belated declaration on terrorism, was on the whole welcomed. The Secretary-General himself had set out a clear and far-ranging role for the Commonwealth - maintaining the coalition against the terrorist threat, helping to overcome the appalling inequalities which in some part fuelled it, and mobilizing diversity and shared values to overcome it.

There had been talk at the meeting of democratic deficits and developmental deficits. It seemed that the events of 11 September had highlighted another deficit - a political leadership deficit. A number of participants hoped that the office of Chair would be clarified at Coolum and used more effectively thereafter. But the deficit ranged more widely. If the ambitious programme set out by the Secretary-General was to succeed, it needed the political will of the heads of government behind it.

For many participants, the postponement of CHOGM contained a silver lining. The streamlined Coolum programme - focusing almost entirely on the heads' retreat - was for many a welcome return to the CHOGMs of the 1970s, but may also become a desirable model for future CHOGMs. The informal but intensive interactions between heads that took place at the retreat was perhaps the most distinctive element of a CHOGM, and had sometimes proved rather valuable in the past.

Many participants had also been attracted by the idea of disentangling the Commonwealth People's Festival from the CHOGM. It had been suggested that the People's Festival and the CHOGM could alternate, with the People's Festival taking place in the country that would host the following year's CHOGM. This would help trim down the scale of CHOGMs while raising the profile of the NGOs' meetings, and might also enable NGOs to engage more effectively with the official structures.

The need for the Commonwealth to review and re-focus its activities had been a recurrent theme of these discussions. A number of speakers had exhorted the Commonwealth to identify its 'comparative advantages', and to concentrate its activities in areas where it could 'add value'. Nevertheless the number of such areas identified at the meeting had been considerable. Nor was it realistic to imagine that the almost constant review of their activities to which the Secretariat and related bodies had been subject had left much scope for cuts. The question of resources was critical. With a budget of only some £35 million pa, the Commonwealth's official bodies could not meet even a fraction of the calls on them.

Of the numerous areas where the Commonwealth had demonstrable advantages, and could 'add value', its work in and with small states had received repeated mention. Was there a danger of the Commonwealth losing momentum on small states issues? Or was there a danger, on the contrary, that the Commonwealth minnows would swallow the Commonwealth whales - that the Commonwealth would cease to offer much of real value to large states? Clearly a realistic balance needed to be kept.

Education had been mentioned in many different contexts: as a bulwark against the spread of fanaticism and intolerance, as one of the keys to sustainable development, as a key to raising the Commonwealth's own profile. Clearly this was an area where the Commonwealth could 'add value' - and where it could be doing a lot more. If there was genuinely to be a Commonwealth of ideas, then the ideas needed to be clear, coherent, and attractive.

The need to attract the new generation had been another recurrent theme. This was a standard piety. How could it be invested with practical meaning? Discussion of the economic 'opportunities' of the Commonwealth, and of the potential Commonwealth role in the issues raised by cultural diversity, had identified two areas where this engagement could start.

Zimbabwe had been touched on by a number of participants, and would inevitably feature at Coolum. The signals that the CHOGM sent on the Zimbabwean crisis would inevitably affect the way people perceived the Commonwealth itself. At the moment, it seemed that the Commonwealth was ducking the issue. There was a danger that, after the postponement of CHOGM, a postponement culture might take hold of the Commonwealth. Procrastination was seldom a wise course.

A number of speakers and participants had referred to the widely-leaked draft report of the High Level Review Group. The report had hardly emerged saturated with praise. It had also in many respects been overtaken by events. It was widely hoped that the heads of government would take the opportunity of their Coolum CHOGM to move decisively beyond the report, and agree a much more ambitious programme for the Commonwealth. Some of the elements of such a programme had been suggested by speakers and participants, though of course there were many others. The present was a critical juncture for the Commonwealth. One way led to the opportunity to fulfil some of its true potential; the other led to irrelevance and decline. Would Commonwealth leaders rise to the challenge?

Participants

Claire Auplat, Associate Fellow, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Amitav Banerji, Director and Head, Office of the Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat; Terry Barringer, Book Reviews Editor, The Round Table; Sir Nicholas Bayne, Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics; Pierre Berthelot, Deputy Director, Special Advisory Services Division, Commonwealth Secretariat; Richard Bourne, Head, Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Indrajit Coomaraswamy, Acting Director, Economic Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat; Stephen Cox, Executive Secretary, The Royal Society; Chair-Designate, The Round Table; Hass Dellal, Director, Australian Multicultural Foundation; Robert Dixon, Global Issues Research Group, FCO; Cheryl Dorall, Freelance Consultant; David French, Director-General, Commonwealth Institute; Ved Goel, Chief Programme Officer, Human Resource Development Division, Commonwealth Secretariat; David Green, Publishing Director, Taylor & Francis; Indrajit Hazra, Journalist (Hindustan Times) and Novelist; Nicholas Hercules, Special Projects Manager, Royal Commonwealth Society; Derek Ingram, President Emeritus, Commonwealth Journalists' Association; Alexandra Jones, Chair, The Round Table; Director-Designate, Strategic Planning and Evaluation Unit, Commonwealth Secretariat; Emmanuel Kattan, Public Affairs Adviser, Office of the Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat; Mohan Kaul, Director-General, Commonwealth Business Council; Joel Kibazo, Director, Communications and Public Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat; Michele Law, Deputy Director, Office of the Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat; Peter Lyon, Editor, The Round Table; HE Donald C. McKinnon, Commonwealth Secretary-General; Sir Michael McWilliam, Former Chairman, Royal Commonwealth Society; Sir Humphrey Maud, Former Deputy Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat; Alex May, Hon. Secretary/Treasurer, The Round Table; Stuart Mole, Director-General, Royal Commonwealth Society; Martin Mulligan, Freelance Journalist; Amrita Narlikar, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, St. John's College, Oxford; Alastair Niven, Principal, St. Catharine's (Cumberland Lodge); Sandra Pepera, Senior Governance Adviser, International Division, Department for International Development; Bishnodat Persaud, Professor, University of the West Indies; Former Director, Economic Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat; James Porter, Former Director-General, Commonwealth Institute; Helen Rennie, Publishing Manager, Taylor & Francis; Adam Robertson, First Secretary (Political), Australian High Commission; Mark Robinson, Director, Commonwealth Press Union; HE Sir Ronald M. Sanders, Chief Foreign Affairs Representative with Ministerial Rank and High Commissioner, Antigua and Barbuda; Aimé Sangara, Director of Public Affairs, Royal Commonwealth Society; Prue Scarlett, Manager, Public Affairs, Commonwealth Business Council; Amanda Shah, League for the Exchange of Commonwealth Teachers; Helena Sharp, Assistant Director for the Commonwealth, British Council; Tim Shaw, Director, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Nicholas Sims, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics; Tim Slack, Former Chairman, The Round Table; Former Principal, St. Catharine's (Cumberland Lodge); Elizabeth Smith, Secretary-General, Commonwealth Broadcasting Association; Helena Whall, Project Officer, Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London; Trish Williams, Chair, UK Branch, Commonwealth Journalists' Association.

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