A message from the Chair
This section was first started by Richard Bourne to give a monthly update for readers and supporters of The Round Table journal on developments leading up to the centenary celebrations of our journal (started in the Edwardian era).
Due to its popularity, it is now being continued by the new Chair of the editorial advisory board, (known since the early twentieth century as the Moot), Stuart Mole.
View the messages by selecting any of the links below:
November 2011
The Perth CHOGM
Qantas put the final seal on the CHOGM. The management's decision to ground all flights the day before the end of the summit looked like an attempt to leverage maximum influence both from CHOGM and - more importantly for Australians - from the Melbourne Gold Cup, due to take place a few days later.
Alan Joyce, Qantas's Dublin-born Chief Executive, used to work at Aer Lingus, and his tough style echoes that of other Irish airline entrepreneurs. His bold and brutal tactics may have seen off the unions but it didn't do much for the Qantas brand. And it left 17 Heads of Government and hundreds more Commonwealth delegates and journalists in a panic searching for other ways to leave town.
How will the Perth CHOGM be remembered?
There was the debacle over the non-publication of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report. There were damning headlines on human rights and Commonwealth values. Foreign Ministers may now have a role at CHOGM but their approach to the EPG report caused considerable anger among members of the group. At the start of the Retreat, it was clear that Heads of Government would need to do considerably better.
Which, by and large, they did. They accepted the proposal for a Commonwealth Charter, one of the EPG's core recommendations. They finally agreed a complete re-vamp of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), the democracy and human rights watchdog, after two previous attempts - in the years since 1999 - had ended in failure. All thirty recommendations of the CMAG report (and, by implication, the ten relating to CMAG in the EPG report) were agreed. CMAG now has a broader remit for intervention in matters of concern, and a greater role in working with the Secretary-General's good offices than before. The emphasis is on a persuasive, rather than a punitive, role. That said, the CMAG report had still not been made publicly available (a bit of a pattern here?) before CHOGM's end.
As regards the EPG's proposal for a Commissioner for Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights, it was always a slightly unrealistic expectation that this would find favour with Commonwealth governments. The idea has actually been kicking around since 1977 and has never made much headway. Few governments are without a skeleton or two in the cupboard and the prospect of a 'Commissioner' rooting through the contents filled many with alarm. It is also worth bearing in mind that CMAG itself would probably never have been established had it not been for the dramatic events surrounding the 1995 Auckland CHOGM. The Nigerian military regime's callous execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists, in defiance of appeals for clemency across the world, demanded an effective Commonwealth response. There was no equivalent stimulus in Perth.
Even so, Heads wisely decided not to reject the proposal outright. Instead, they tasked the chairman of CMAG to explore with the Secretary-General "the relevant options" relating to the proposal and report back to Foreign Ministers at their meeting in New York next September. This may yet result in some enhanced capacity in support of CMAG and the Secretary-General in upholding Commonwealth values.
Leaders also rescued the EPG report from turning into a public relations disaster. First, they demonstrated to the EPG that they were taking the report seriously by dealing with a few of its key recommendations initially and requiring their foreign ministers to work through the night on the remainder. Second, after the conclusion of their further discussion of the EPG's report, on the final day, they were able to signal outright agreement on 30 of the report's 106 recommendations. A further 12 were agreed, subject to the financial implications, and an additional 10 were subsumed under the agreement on an expanded role for CMAG. 43 recommendations were remitted to a Task Force of Ministers for further consideration and report, and only 11 were rejected outright.
Heads of Government also made clear their expectation of early Commonwealth reform - in streamlining and prioritising its programmes to achieve maximum impact; and in shaking up the Secretariat.
The big unanswered question after Perth is about Commonwealth leadership.
Certainly, Julia Gillard, the Australian Prime Minister, acquitted herself creditably in her role as CHOGM host. This augurs well for her new position as the Commonwealth's chair. Australia is also a member of the new CMAG, as is Canada (still smarting from some bruising exchanges over Sri Lanka). The other CMAG members - Bangladesh, Jamaica, Maldives, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago and Vanuatu - might all be expected to play a positive part in re-energising CMAG.
But what of the Commonwealth Secretary-General?
Earlier in the meeting, his speeches - at the Opening Ceremony and elsewhere - were rather tired and lacking in penetration. By the end, however, confirmation of his second four year term in office seemed to have raised his spirits. Much will now depend on his leadership over the next two years in particular.
Perth was billed as the 'make or break' summit. In truth, reality is rarely that stark. But, in re-confirming Sri Lanka as CHOGM hosts in 2013, the Commonwealth has embarked on a path which will test its visibility and credibility as a values-based organisation. It is also a period which will require the Commonwealth to demonstrate the effectiveness and relevance of its programmes and institutions.
After Perth, the stakes on the long-term future of the Commonwealth have got a whole lot higher.
Stuart Mole